


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
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AMERICAN CIVIL WAR



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THE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN
THEATRE FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF HOSTILITIES TO MAY 5, 1863, AND
IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY FROM
APRIL 1861 TO JUNE 1862

BY

J. H. ANDERSON, F.R.HIST.SOC.


BARRISTER-AT-LAW; LATE LECTURER AT KING'S COLL., LONDON; SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE
IN INDIAN CIVIL, AND HOME CIVIL (CLASS I.) EXAMINATIONS; LECTURER ON
MILITARY HISTORY AND STRATEGY AT 5, LEXHAM GARDENS, W.,
AND LATELY AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

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PREFACE

FOR this work the authorities relied on are:

Nicolay, "Outbreak of Rebellion"; Webb, "Peninsula"; Allan, "Valley Campaign" and "Army of Northern Virginia"; Doyle, "History of the United States"; Henderson, "Stonewall Jackson"; Kellogg, "Shenandoah Valley"; Ropes, "Story of the Civil War"; Wood and Edmonds, "History of the War"; Ropes, "Army under Pope"; Palfrey, "Antietam and Fredericksburg"; Henderson, "Tactics of Fredericksburg."

Federal officers' names are in ordinary type, Confederate officers' in italic. The numbers, which are much disputed, are only approximately correct.




TABLE OF DATES

1860. Nov. Election of Mr. Lincoln.
 Dec. 20. South Carolina secedes.
1861. March 4. Lincoln's accession to office.
 April 13. Surrender of Fort Sumter.
 April 29. *Jackson* at Harper's Ferry.
 July 11. Combat at Rich Mountain.
 July 13. Combat at Carrick's Ford.
 July 21. Battle of First Bull Run.
 Nov. 1. McClellan Federal Commander-in-Chief.
 Nov. 4. *Jackson* commands in the Valley.
1862. Feb. 27. Banks crosses the Potomac.
 March 8. Monroe plan adopted.
 March 8 and 9. Actions of the *Merrimac*.
 March 9. *Johnston* retires from Centreville.
 March 12. McClellan confined to the Army of the Potomac.
 March 16. Change in Banks' plans.
 March 17. McClellan embarks.

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1862. March 23. Battle of Kernstown.
March 31. Blenker assigned to Frémont.
April 2. McClellan at Monroe.
April 3. First withdrawal of McDowell.
April 4. McClellan moves.
April 5–May 3. McClellan before Yorktown.
April 16. McClellan tries to force the Warwick River.
April 19. McDowell on Fredericksburg.
April 20. Franklin's Division reaches McClellan.
April 29. *Ewell* and *Edward Johnson* under *Jackson*.
May 3. Confederates evacuate Yorktown.
May 3. Second withdrawal of McDowell.
May 5. Battle of Williamsburg.
May 8. Battle of McDowell.
May 11. Blenker joins Frémont.
May 11. Destruction of the *Merrimac*.
May 12. Shields detached from Banks to McDowell.
May 13. Banks at Strasburg.
May 21. McClellan on the Chickahominy.
May 23. Combat of Front Royal.
May 24. Third withdrawal of McDowell.

1862. May 24. McClellan astride the Chickahominy.
- May 25. Battle of Winchester.
- May 27. Porter on Hanover Court House.
- May 31 and June 1. Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.
- June 1. *Jackson* at Strasburg.
- June 6. Death of *Ashby*.
- June 8. Battle of Cross Keys.
- June 9. Battle of Port Republic.
- June 9. Fourth withdrawal of McDowell.
- June 12. *Stuart's* Pamunkey Raid.
- June 17. *Jackson* on Richmond.
- June 25-July 1. Seven Days' Battles.
- July 11. Halleck Federal Commander-in-Chief.
- Aug. 9. Battle of Cedar Mountain.
- Aug. 20. McClellan embarks at Fort Monroe.
- Aug. 22. *Stuart's* Catlett's Station Raid.
- Aug. 25. *Jackson's* flank march round Pope's right.
- Aug. 28. Battle of Gainesville.
- Aug. 29. Battle of Groveton.
- Aug. 30. Battle of Second Manassas or Second Bull Run.
- Sept. 1. Battle of Chantilly.

1862. Sept. 4. *Lee* invades Maryland.
Sept. 14. Battle of South Mountain.
Sept. 15. *Jackson* captures Harper's Ferry.
Sept. 16-17. Battle of the Antietam.
Oct. 9-13. *Stuart's* Pennsylvania Raid.
Dec. 13. Battle of Fredericksburg.
Dec. 25. *Stuart's* Christmas Day Raid.
1863. April 7. Naval Battle off Charleston.
May 1-5. Battle of Chancellorsville.
May 10. Death of *Jackson*.

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
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American Civil War

CHAPTER I

CAUSES OF THE WAR

THE War of Secession, or Civil War, or Great Rebellion, in the United States, 1861-5, was unique amongst the wars of the nineteenth century—a civil war of gigantic proportions on a theatre of immense extent, from Baltimore to St. Louis, and from New Orleans to Florida, marked by fearful bloodshed and attended by remarkable innovations, *e.g.* ironclads, railways, breech-loaders, torpedoes, and telegraphs; and in it the whole people learned the trade of war. In 1861 the United States had 16,000 regular soldiers, but in five years the North had armed 2,500,000 and the South 600,000 men. Great generals also made their appearance—for the North, Grant, McClellan, and Sherman; for the South, *Lee, Johnston, and Jackson.*

The United States were divided by the imaginary Mason and Dixon's line ($36^{\circ} 30'$), which runs westwards up the Potomac, along the Ohio, and then over the Mississippi, into two totally

different sections. It was this difference that accounted for the dispute over the slavery question, which is popularly regarded as the main cause of war. In the North (Stars and Stripes) manufactures, machinery, plutocracy, and protection predominated, and slaves were not suitable in their industries. The Republicans therefore—which party prevailed in the North—regarded slavery with aversion. In the South (Stars and Bars), on the contrary, the dominant party, the free trade and aristocratic Democrats, looked on slavery as an indispensable institution, because slaves, though really a more wasteful and expensive form of labour than white workers, could be employed in their pastoral and agricultural pursuits, especially on tobacco, cotton, and sugar estates. When, therefore, the election of Abraham Lincoln, an avowed though moderate Abolitionist, to the Presidency, in November, 1860, showed the South that they no longer controlled the executive, they saw that sooner or later emancipation must become a practical question, and in their eyes emancipation meant their ruin.

The other great cause of war was the question of States' Rights. In the South it was held that, if the Central or Federal Government forced on any legislation of which any State disapproved, that State had a right to secede from the Union, and legally, I believe, that view was correct. Needless to say, the North adopted the

opposite opinion. Hence it was that the war was known by its three names of the Great Civil War, the Great Rebellion, and the War of Secession.

Minor causes there were; for the Southern Democratic politicians, certain to be ousted from office by the new Republican President who would enter the White House on March 4, 1861, hated the new Administration, and all the Southern planters in debt to Northern financiers saw in war a chance of evading their obligations.

Eleven States declared for Secession, namely, the Confederate States of South and North Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee (except East Tennessee), Arkansas, and East Virginia. On the other side stood twenty-two Federal States, namely, all the Northern and North-Eastern States, *e.g.* Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, West Virginia; and in the West, California and Oregon. On the borderland lay three doubtful States—Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland.

CHAPTER II

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

DOYLE, in his "History of America," says :
"The territory of the South might be looked on as a vast fortress guarded by the Potomac, the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Atlantic." From Harper's Ferry to the Gulf of Mexico measured 800 miles, and in this region the railways were few—facts which militated against any invasion—the principal being (1) Washington—Richmond—Chattanooga—New Orleans; (2) Washington—Richmond—Weldon—Atlanta—New Orleans; (3) Cairo—New Orleans; (4) Cairo—Mobile; (5) Louisville—Nashville—Atlanta—Mobile; (6) Richmond—Wilmington—Charleston—Savannah.

The most important portion of the theatre was Virginia. This State comprised West Virginia, lying west of the Alleghanies, a manufacturing district inhabited almost exclusively by whites, hunters, and lumber-men, strongly attached to the Union; and East Virginia, between the Alleghanies and the ocean. This district, engaged in the tobacco industry, employed many

slaves, and was strongly Secessionist. In the plain east of the Blue Ridge the roads were very bad, forests and swamps numerous, and the rivers—*e.g.* the Rappahannock, the James, etc.—constituted formidable obstacles. For all these reasons the railways were of supreme importance to both combatants. The chief railways were: (1) Baltimore and Ohio connecting Washington with the West; branch, Harper's Ferry to Winchester; (2) Orange and Alexandria from Washington to Gordonsville; branches, Washington to Leesburg, and Manassas Junction—Strasburg—Mount Jackson; (3) Virginia Central from Richmond to Gordonsville and westwards to Staunton and Lynchburg; (4) from Richmond to Fredericksburg; (5) Richmond—White House—West Point; (6) from Richmond southwards. Besides, there was the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal along the Potomac. In this district of Virginia, Richmond was a political capital, commercial centre, ordnance dépôt, river port, and railway terminus.

It only remains to describe the Shenandoah Valley, of which Allan, in his "Jackson's Valley Campaign," gives the following description: "It is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by other ridges of the Alleghanies or Appalachians. The width varies from 12 to 24 miles, and the length is 140 miles. Near Front Royal the Shenandoah divides into

Map 3

two forks, between which run the Massanutton Mountains; on the western side of these mountains lies the Valley. On the eastern side, *i.e.* between the Blue Ridge and the Massanuttons, lies the Luray Valley. Through the Valley runs the North Fork until it joins the South Fork at Front Royal; the South Fork runs through the Luray Valley. This Fork is made up of the North, Middle, and South Rivers, which unite near Port Republic.

"The great Valley turnpike passes through Staunton, Newmarket, Winchester, and on to the Potomac River, whilst an inferior road traverses the Luray Valley. These two roads are connected by a road leading from Newmarket right across the Massanuttons." Though most of the roads were not good, yet the Valley generally was favourable for troops to manœuvre. The most important strategic points were Winchester and Staunton; as to the celebrated Harper's Ferry, it was tactically untenable, but it connected the Confederate States with Maryland, it commanded the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and was regarded by both sides as a sort of Thermopylæ, having consequently a certain moral importance. It should be noted that the railways in the Valley, *viz.* the Baltimore and Ohio with branch Harper's Ferry—Winchester, the Manassas Gap rail up to Mount Jackson, and the Virginia Central through Staunton, did not materially affect the operations,

except as lines of supply. The most important bridges were over the South Fork, viz. Front Royal, White House, Columbia, Conrad's Store, and over the North River at Port Republic. To the Federals the Valley, as it led them away from Richmond, was less important than to the Confederates, who from it drew large supplies, and who possessed in it a covered line of operation against Washington. Late in the war Sheridan, realising this, laid it waste, thereby rendering it useless to the Southern forces.

N.B.—Richmond to Washington is 100 miles, Richmond to Fort Monroe 70 miles, Staunton to Harrisonburg 25 miles, Harrisonburg to Strasburg 47 miles, Strasburg to Winchester 18 miles, Winchester to Harper's Ferry 28 miles.

CHAPTER III

THE RESOURCES OF THE COMBATANTS

THE combatants were not equally matched in the matter of resources. It is true, of course, that the very size of the Confederacy, the small number of railways, and the determined feelings of the population, were strong factors for the South, but, on the whole, the weight of power rested with the North. The Federals possessed all that there was of military and naval organisation. With regard to the latter, no naval officers joined Secession, and the North controlled all the Navy and numerous merchant vessels, and thus could easily blockade the Confederate ports, could indeed starve the people, stop the importation of war material, and, by holding the Mississippi, cut the Confederacy in two. The blockade policy was, perhaps, a political error, because the Federal President thus almost admitted that he was dealing, not with rebels, but with a separate nation, and indeed Great Britain did recognise the South as belligerents. The command of the sea gave considerable advantages to the Union

THE RESOURCES OF THE COMBATANTS 23

armies, for with it they could shift their bases and could hardly be intercepted (compare Sir John Moore, 1808). It is true, of course, that the goodwill of the population made the Southerners also very independent with regard to bases.

As to military forces, the United States, in 1861, possessed 16,000 regulars, mostly Germans and Irish, who were employed to control the Indians. The privates practically all joined the Northern side, but only 3,000 could at first be spared for the Civil War. Many regular officers declared for Secession, and the generals on that side were undeniably superior, whilst the President and Commander-in-Chief, *Mr. Davis*, a soldier himself, was always guided by the advice of *Robert E. Lee*; but on both sides the inferior officers were bad, and the Federal staff was a complete failure.

In fact, both had to create a military organisation, and both found undisciplined volunteers incapable of offensive action. The South, with its 6,000,000 of whites, could not compete in numbers with the 20,000,000 whites of the North, and its wealth, consisting mainly of cotton, could not rival the enormous financial resources of the Northern manufacturers. The splendidly equipped Federal militia and volunteers formed a contrast to the wretchedly supplied Southerners, who, however, were naturally better adapted to war. There was not much to choose between the

infantry on both sides, but the Southern cavalry was undeniably superior, and their leader, *J. E. B. Stuart*, a born cavalry officer. All the cavalry fought much on foot; it was mounted infantry, carrying revolvers, rifles, carbines, but not swords, bayonets, or lances. The armament, supplied from Europe, consisted of muzzle-loaders, effective at 250 yards, and of various patterns of guns. The Federal rifled artillery was effective at 2,000 yards; the Confederate artillery was less numerous and less powerful.

I should add that the authorities are not agreed as to whether the cavalry constantly carried swords.

CHAPTER IV

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861

IN 1860, before Lincoln's accession to office (March 4, 1861), all the United States forts on the east coast had been seized by the seceding States, except Tortugas and Key West in Florida, Forts Sumter and Moultrie near Charleston, in South Carolina, and Fort Monroe in Virginia. South Carolina held very strong Secessionist views, and, as a fact, seceded on December 20, 1860.

Six days afterwards the Federal officer at Fort Moultrie, Major Anderson, transferred his 100 men to Fort Sumter, a stronger fort on an island in the Charleston harbour. This enraged the South Carolinians, who at once seized Fort Moultrie—an act of war. The Federal Government of President Buchanan in 1861 imposed on Anderson the difficult task of holding Fort Sumter without resorting to any offensive action against the obviously hostile preparations of the South Carolinians, and the only real criticism passed on him is that he failed to ask for reinforcements in time. On March 4 his provisions would last only six

weeks longer, and on April 13 the fort surrendered to the Confederate General, *Beauregard*, who brought to bear on it a very heavy fire. The effect on the Northern States was electrical, especially as soon afterwards the Southerners seized the United States Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, and the United States armoury at Harper's Ferry.

Lincoln at once called up 75,000 three months' militia, and, after dealing with a Confederate rising in Baltimore, which for a time isolated Washington, the President, by the middle of June, 1861, succeeded in occupying the last-named city and its suburbs, as well as Baltimore itself, with Union troops, and in securing Maryland, Missouri, and, by September of this year, Kentucky also, for the Federal cause. He also called for three years' volunteers, so as to raise the land forces to 156,000 and the sea forces to 25,000. These large forces had to be trained, a task of which the aged Lieut.-General, Winfield Scott, was obviously incapable. On the other side also, *President Davis*, who possessed far more military training than did Lincoln, found equal difficulty in organising, owing to lack of resources.

On April 29, 1861, *Colonel Jackson* took command of 4,500 men at Harper's Ferry, covering Winchester, the real key of the important Shenandoah Valley; he was opposed by General Patterson with 14,000 Federals on the northern bank, whilst

in West Virginia, valuable as a recruiting ground, as a source of supply, and because through it ran the Baltimore and Ohio railway, some Confederate troops sent from Richmond were dispersed at a skirmish known as Philippi Races; and, when *Generals Wise* and *Garnett* arrived to renew the contest, the Federals, under General G. B. McClellan, totally defeated them at Rich Mountain, July 11, and at Carrick's Ford, July 13.

Towards the end of May *General Joseph E. Johnston* succeeded to the command at Harper's Ferry, his numbers being raised to 10,000; and, on Patterson crossing the Potomac to Martinsburg, the Southern general, recognising Harper's Ferry as untenable, retired in June on Winchester, his small body of cavalry being led by the celebrated *Stuart*, and *Jackson* commanding the brigade afterwards famous as the Stonewall Brigade. Patterson, whose three months' volunteers demanded their discharge, then recrossed to the north bank, but, on hearing of McDowell's intended move from Washington against *General Beauregard* at Manassas Junction, he, at the end of June, crossed again to the south bank at Williamsport. It was during this advance of Patterson that *Jackson* and *Stuart* checked him in the rear-guard action at Falling Waters, midway between Martinsburg and Williamsport.

At this time *Beauregard* held Manassas Junction with 20,000 men, threatened in front by the

b h Federal General McDowell's 35,000, who were mainly three months' militia, and whom General Scott considered unsuitable for battle. McDowell's army was composed of :

I. Division under Tyler, in four brigades ;

II. Division under Hunter, afterwards Porter, in two brigades, including some regular infantry and cavalry ;

III. Division under Heintzelman, in three brigades ;

IV. Division under Runyon ;

V. Division under Miles, in two brigades ;

Besides 49 guns of the regular army.

General Johnston, knowing the value of interior lines, held Patterson by able demonstrations, and, moving without Patterson's knowledge *via* Ashby's Gap, entrained on the Manassas Gap railroad, joining *Beauregard* just in time for the Battle of the First Manassas, or First Bull Run, July 21. His arrival, together with that of *Holmes'* brigade of 1,300 men from Acquia Creek, raised *Beauregard* to 29,000. In detail the Confederate force was thus constituted :

Army of the Potomac (afterwards 1st Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia), under *Brigadier-General Beauregard*, in six brigades, with 29 guns and some cavalry, besides *Holmes'* 1,300 men and 6 guns ; Army of the Shenandoah, under *Johnston*, in four brigades, with 22 guns and a small body of cavalry.

BATTLE OF THE FIRST MANASSAS, OR FIRST
BULL RUN, JULY 21

Beauregard lay west of the Bull Run, a stream with high and woody banks and several fords, which he guarded. It had been McDowell's intention to turn the enemy on the south, but the roads in that direction were bad, and so he decided to turn the enemy's left or northern flank. Consequently he placed a reserve at Centreville and a containing force opposite *Beauregard's* right, and then sent a turning force, which was helped by part of the Federal centre on the turnpike crossing near the Stone Bridge. This combination would have rolled up the Confederate left, but for a successful charge by *Stuart*, and but for *Jackson's* vigorous resistance on the Henry House Hill (hence his title of *Stonewall*). The finishing stroke was given by *Kirby Smith*, who, detraining at Manassas Junction 1,900 men of *Johnston's* Shenandoah Army, came up on *Jackson's* left; the Federals fled on Washington, all except the regulars, in rout, *Johnston* following leisurely to Centreville.

Remarks on the Battle.—(1) This battle illustrates the danger of an army astride a river, in which position it is liable to two strokes, one against the external flank of the turning force, as occurred in this case, to prevent which that flank should be thrown back; the other against the force

covering the communications—and this is the more formidable stroke; and *Beauregard* did issue an order for his right to cross and attack. Fortunately for the Federals the order was not executed, partly because it miscarried, and partly because of the vigour of McDowell's onset on the Confederate left. (2) The Federal losses were 2,800 men and 25 guns, the Confederate 1,900 men. (3) The battle made foreign countries take a favourable view of Confederate chances, and the South relied too much on this, and also foolishly supposed that Northern cowardice had given them the victory. (4) Both sides had raw troops, who act better on the defensive, volunteers being inferior to regulars in action, and in the offensive generally. (5) Federal tactics bad, and showed want of training, *e.g.* they attacked piecemeal. (6) Henderson has said that *Johnston* was wrong in not pursuing and entering Washington; but Ropes holds that he could not have captured the city, for the regulars and the troops not engaged, *i.e.* Divisions of Miles and Runyon, could have held the works. (7) *Kirby Smith's* tactical employment of the railway was as marked as it was unusual, though *Elandslaagte* in 1899 affords another instance.

For the rest of 1861 *Johnston* occupied Centreville, and in the Valley Patterson recrossed to the north bank of the Potomac. His great error had been that he did not hold *Johnston* by

vigorous attacks. Meantime, in West Virginia the Confederates made another effort, this time under the celebrated *Robert E. Lee*, against Rosecrans, the successor of McClellan; the effort failed, and West Virginia was permanently secured for the Union cause.

On November 4 *Jackson*, with the rank of Major-General, was appointed to the command of the Shenandoah Valley, in which position he fully realised the importance to the South of controlling the Baltimore and Ohio railway as well as the valley of the Monongahela River up to the great lakes, by which means Washington would be severed from the west. At the same time, on the Federal side Scott retired, being succeeded on November 1 by McClellan, a great organiser, in the command of all the Union forces, thousands of whom came pouring into Washington. All this time at Centreville lay *Johnston*, with the poorly equipped Army of Northern Virginia, now organised in two army corps under *Beauregard* (afterwards *Longstreet*) and *G. W. Smith* (afterwards *Jackson*)—total strength 40,000. *Johnston* had in October urged that he should be reinforced by 20,000 men and should be allowed to invade the North; *President Davis* declined, in view of “the safety of other threatened positions.” An invasion at this time would have had great chance of success, for it would have caught McClellan with troops not

yet organised, and would have exercised marked influence on foreign countries. *Mr. Davis* committed a serious error, for defence cannot succeed without offensive action.

Jackson's troops at Winchester in the Valley comprised his Stonewall Brigade, some militia, and *Colonel Turner Ashby's* irregular horse, the last named patrolling the Potomac—total 4,000. The connection with his chief, *Johnston*, was formed by *D. H. Hill* at Leesburg. *Jackson* had to consider *Patterson's* successor, *Banks*—a bad political appointment of an untrained man—with 18,000 on the north bank, *Kelly* with 5,000 at Romney, and *Rosecrans* with 22,000 on the Great Kanawha River, whence he might move on the important town of Staunton; this place was protected by winter, by a difficult country and by 6,000 men under *Loring* and 1,200 men under *Edward Johnson*. *Jackson's* first exploit was, during December, to destroy a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal west of Williamsport. With this posture of affairs on either side, the year 1861 came to a close, so far as serious operations were concerned.

At the time, *i.e.* during the autumn of 1861, in Washington itself long discussions took place on what should be *McClellan's* plan of campaign. General *Scott* had always been in favour of operating by the Mississippi, whereas *McClellan* at first proposed a most ambitious plan, which,

says Webb, in his "Peninsula," meant striking the enemy in the West and in the East, in Tennessee—especially East Tennessee—and in Virginia, and assailing points on the Atlantic coasts and on the Mississippi. This implied that the general himself should march a great army, accompanied by a fleet, right through the Southern territories, whilst Burnside acted on the coast of North Carolina, and Sherman dealt with Savannah in Georgia and Charleston in South Carolina. This gigantic plan was never executed, except as regards some operations, chiefly naval, which resulted, by March, 1862, in considerable success for the Federals; the forts at Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, were captured by Flag-Officer Stringham's vessels and Major-General Butler's troops (Butler was a bad political appointment of an untrained man); Flag-Officer Goldsborough's naval force and Major-General Burnside's 12,000 troops captured Roanoke Island, North Carolina, and Newberne in the same State; in South Carolina Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman, with 12,000 men, occupied Beaufort; all the coast towns of Florida were also secured.

With his main forces round Washington, however, the Federal commander did nothing during the autumn of 1861, the public debt rose fast, and so did public indignation, especially as he allowed the Southerners to erect batteries closing

the lower Potomac, as a Federal movement across that river near Ball's Bluff was a bad failure, and as the roads in October and November were known to be good; and there is no doubt that the general should have captured Norfolk and the Confederate batteries, and also, if he had known *Johnston's* real numbers, should have driven back that general. He should have done something, though he was quite right in thinking that his army required thorough organising before attempting anything on a grand scale. About Christmas, 1861, everything had to wait, partly owing to the awful state of the roads, and partly to McClellan's serious illness.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862

ON Christmas Day, 1861, the arrival of *Loring's* men had raised the Winchester force to 11,000—*i.e.* 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 26 guns, consisting of the Stonewall Brigade under *Garnett*, *Ashby's* cavalry, 2,500 militia, and *Loring's* three brigades; and, as Banks seemed inclined to advance, the Southern general on New Year's Day promptly took the offensive against Kelly, moving in bitter weather on Bath and Hancock, where he took many stores and did much damage. He then turned on Romney, which Kelly had already evacuated, with the loss of his magazines. The unruly character of *Loring's* command prevented anything further; he consequently left *Loring* at Romney and marched the rest of his men to Winchester. This expedition had secured three counties, and a fertile district, and placed the enemy on the defensive; "but the work was quickly undone" (Wood and Edmonds), for during this month of January, *Mr. Benjamin*, the Secretary of War, instructed *Jackson* to recall *Loring*,

that officer then being detached from the Winchester command. This was such a gross case of civilian interference that the general sent in his resignation, which, however, was finally withdrawn. The result of *Benjamin's* action was that in February *Jackson's Army of the Valley*—4,600 strong—had at Winchester to face Banks on the north bank of the Potomac, Shields who had re-occupied Romney, and perhaps Rosecrans's successor, Frémont (a bad political appointment of an untrained man), on the great Kanawha River. This last general, called the "Pathfinder," commanded in the Mountain Department, *i.e.* West Virginia, with 16,000 men, composed of the Brigades of Milroy, Schenck, and Bayard, and of Blenker's Division of Sumner's II. Corps, 7,000 strong, which did not, however, reach him at Petersburg till May 11.

Loring having departed, and the militia having melted away, *Jackson's* 4,600 men were made up of the Stonewall Brigade, *Gilham's* or *Burks'* brigade, *Taliaferro's* two regiments, *Ashby's* 600 cavalry and 27 guns. During the same month of February *Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia*, 47,000 strong, at Centreville, had to face the great Army of the Potomac which McClellan had in the winter organised at Washington. The total number of men in the Eastern district under the Federal Commander-in-Chief, including those along the Potomac and in West Virginia, ran up

to 215,000, with 242 heavy guns and 446 field guns, all being volunteers except about 4,600 regulars, and the absentees through sickness and on leave granted by their colonels being numerous. The following is a detailed statement of the Army of the Potomac:

(A) Troops sent to the Yorktown Peninsula :

II. Corps under Sumner, consisting of the Divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and a few cavalry—the third Division (Blenker's) was transferred to Frémont;

III. Corps under Heintzelman, consisting of the Divisions of Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton (afterwards Kearney), and a few cavalry;

IV. Corps under Keyes, consisting of the Divisions of Couch, Smith, and Casey, and a few cavalry.

The guns totalled 168, and in addition were some reserve cavalry, Colonel Hunt's regular artillery (100 guns), and General Sykes' regular infantry, besides a siege train and engineers.

(B) Left to protect Washington :

I. Corps under McDowell, consisting of the Divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King, and a few cavalry, with 68 guns;

V. Corps under Banks, consisting of the Divisions of Williams and Shields and numerous cavalry, with 65 guns;

18,000 garrison troops at Washington, under Wadsworth;

Small force at Baltimore, under General Dix.

As to the cavalry, which, except the regulars, was bad, it was under the general control of General Stoneman.

On February 27 Banks, with the Divisions of Williams, Shields, and Sedgwick—the last not yet detached to McClellan—38,000 men with 80 guns, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and on March 9 *Johnston*, including *D. H. Hill* at Leesburg, fell back from Centreville southwards along the Orange and Alexandria railway, evacuating the batteries placed by the Confederates on the lower Potomac. This retirement was either due to a traitor informing *Johnston* of McClellan's intention, or due to *Johnston's* own suspicions of those intentions, or due to *Mr. Davis'* idea that the Confederate army was too exposed, and to his alarm at the Federal capture in February of two forts in West Tennessee; McClellan feigned a pursuit. On the other side of the Blue Ridge *Jackson* however clung to Winchester, feeling sure that by doing so he would alarm Mr. Lincoln for his communications with the West; but when Banks pressed him he retired to Mount Jackson, Shields' Division then occupying Strasburg.

Before he fell at the end of 1861, McClellan had suggested a direct attack on *Johnston* at Centreville, but on his recovery in the first weeks of 1862 the roads prevented all operations. Still, he knew he was expected, especially by

Mr. Secretary Stanton, the evil genius of the war, to do something, and so he began to form his Potomac scheme. At that time he had at Washington 158,000 men, not counting 55,000 needed for the Washington garrison, forces needed for Manassas Junction, for the Valley, and for the Potomac River; whereas *Johnston* at Centreville had only 50,000 at most. There were five possible lines of operation. (1) Direct advance on Centreville and Manassas, which the President preferred because it covered the capital, and if the Confederate numbers had been known—a faulty Intelligence Department gave them as 115,000—that plan should have been adopted. The objections to it were the state of the roads, the fact that the army would depend on a railway peculiarly liable to raids, and the indiscipline, which, however, was as marked in the hostile forces. Ropes, who prefers this plan, disagrees with Henderson. (2) By water to Acquia Creek and thence *via* Fredericksburg to Richmond; this would give a railway for supplies, but would leave the right flank exposed to *Johnston*. (3) By water to Urbanna and thence to Richmond; this, the shortest land route to Richmond, would get rid of Yorktown, Gloucester, and Norfolk, and by it McClellan foolishly expected to capture Richmond before *Magruder* in the Yorktown Peninsula or *Johnston* could come to the rescue. The objections were that Urbanna was a bad

landing-place, that *Johnston* might assail the flank, and that the Dragoon Swamp and two rivers must be crossed. (4) By water to Mob Jack Bay, north of York River, and thence on to Richmond. (5) By water to the Federal Fort Monroe, and thence up the Yorktown Peninsula; the Confederates expected this, and McClellan preferred either No. 3 or No. 4, but if he should use this route intended, if he could not reach Richmond up the Peninsula, to cross the James and attack the city from the south. Those who, like Henderson, prefer one of plans 3, 4, 5 to the Manassas plan maintain that by the Monroe route the army would cover its own communications, and that all three plans really protected Washington, because the Confederates could not attack it whilst Richmond was in peril and whilst the Federals in the Valley menaced the Confederate communications with the West, and that, assuming McClellan's idea of *Johnston's* numbers to be correct—and the general honestly thought they were correct—a direct attack was not to be thought of; they add, moreover, that the general's innate caution was intensified by the Trent affair, November, 1861, when Slidell and Mason, two Southern commissioners, were seized by the Federal Captain Wilkes on board a British vessel, which might have involved hostilities with Great Britain.

Ropes, on the other hand, who prefers the

Manassas plan, points out that the Monroe plan meant a march through a practically unknown district, that the Confederate ironclad *Merrimac* or *Virginia* held the River James—this vessel on March 8 sank two Federal vessels, and next day was barely checked by the Federal ironclad *Monitor*; that the three plans Nos. 3, 4, 5 involved the risk that *Johnston* might not retire, but attack Washington whilst McClellan was in the transports, and even the Urbanna plan would not put him at Richmond before *Johnston* could arrive; that the Monroe plan was worse, for the *Merrimac* had to be reckoned with, as well as the batteries at Yorktown, Gloucester, and Norfolk. He took it because Lincoln forbade the Urbanna route and, indeed, compelled him to choose between the Manassas route and the Monroe route, in the hope that he would select the former. The President's view also was a great factor against the Monroe plan. This plan was, however, agreed upon on March 8, and the choice could not therefore have been affected, as so often stated, by *Johnston's* retirement, which occurred on the 9th. Ropes concludes the discussion by saying that McClellan's plan was as bad as General Sir W. Howe's movement by sea up Chesapeake Bay and march on Philadelphia, 1777. To complete the matter it should be noted that on March 12, whilst in feigned pursuit of *Johnston*, McClellan was, with every mark

of studied discourtesy, deprived of all command outside the Army of the Potomac, and that the President's assent to the Monroe plan was conditional on Washington and Manassas Junction being left secure; unfortunately it was not decided who was to be the judge of that security, and on this rock the whole campaign was wrecked.

We must now consider how far McClellan fulfilled the condition about securing Washington. The defences of the capital devised by him consisted of a cordon of forts extending south of the Potomac from below Alexandria beyond the Arlington Heights to Chain Bridge; and on the Maryland side from the Potomac to the Eastern branch near Bladensburgh and thence along the heights to a point nearly opposite Alexandria—a circuit of 33 miles. The garrison necessary for these works was fixed by his corps commanders at 35,000—Generals Thomas and Hitchcock, however, advised that 55,000 were required—but McClellan left only 18,000 inferior troops under an inferior general, Wordsworth, named indeed by Lincoln himself. He did, it is true, argue that he had left 73,000 because he included troops at Warrenton, at Manassas (4,500 under Abercrombie, of Williams' Division of Banks' Army), in the Shenandoah Valley, including Blenker's 7,000 men *en route* to join Frémont, and along the Potomac—of course not including Frémont in

West Virginia and McDowell's I. Corps; but, even so, 73,000 cannot be found, and the President naturally regarded the 18,000 only as left. McClellan had not fulfilled the condition.

As the Government had accepted the Monroe plan, a change came on March 16 over Banks' plans; he had already detached Sedgwick's Division to McClellan, and now, to render Washington more secure, he, by McClellan's orders, retired Shields on Winchester, and despatched his other division under Williams eastward for Manassas. *Ashby* incorrectly reported Shields as being very weak, and consequently *Jackson*, marching 36 miles in two days, brought on the battle of Kernstown, with the sole object of recalling as many Federals as possible into the Valley, which is the keynote of all *Jackson's* operations in the Valley campaign.

BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN, MARCH 23

The Southerners numbered 3,400 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 27 guns against Shields' 7,000 (Kellogg says 11,000), including 750 cavalry and 24 guns. *Jackson* would have waited till the next day had not his position been visible to the enemy, who held a strong position on both sides of the turnpike; his plan of battle was to hold them on the turnpike with half *Ashby's* mounted men, detach the other half to cover his left, and turn Shields' right by moving along the high

Map 5

ridge with his main body. In spite of the Federal guns on Pritchard's Hill, the Confederates gained the ridge, taking post behind a wall just as a strong body of Federals fell on them from the north. A fierce conflict ensued. The Federals, leaving only a small force to contain *Ashby* on the turnpike, moved more men to the ridge, and broke the Confederate line. *Jackson's* men, covered by their cavalry on the left, fell back sullenly along the road southwards, with the loss of 2 guns and 700 men; the Federals had lost 590 men.

Comments.—Note *Jackson's* excellent tactics in moving in strength along the ridge. The real danger was that the Federals might have held his left and moved in force along the turnpike. *Jackson's* tactics much like those of Havelock at Cawnpore, 1857.

The Confederate, defeated tactically, had succeeded strategically, for Kernstown had alarmed Lincoln for the safety of Washington, with the following effects: Williams was recalled on Winchester; Blenker's Division, unjustifiably detached by the President from McClellan, was directed on March 31 to move across the Valley to join Frémont in West Virginia; McDowell's Corps, also detached from McClellan, was halted at Manassas, 40,000 strong. In Ropes' opinion this action of the President was justifiable; in Henderson's view foolish, because, he says, the

best way to secure Washington was to strengthen McClellan. Totally indefensible, however, were the five separate commands which the President and Mr. Stanton then constituted—namely, McClellan in the Yorktown Peninsula, McDowell in the Department of the Rappahannock, the pugnacious Banks in the Valley, Frémont in West Virginia, and the Governor of Fort Monroe (this last was specially absurd), besides detachments under Burnside and Sherman, on the eastern coast. The above withdrawal of McDowell, the first of his series of withdrawals, ordered on April 3, was particularly important, because McClellan had meant him to land on the north bank of the York River, and turn Yorktown.

Banks, having arrived in person, leisurely pursued with Shields' and Williams' Divisions up the Valley, where *Jackson* took up a position at Rude's Hill, just south of Mount Jackson, effectually checking the Federal advance, and attaining his main object, which was to detain as many of the enemy as possible from helping McClellan. At this period *General Edward Johnson* (Confederate), with 2,800 men near Staunton—to which place he had retired owing to *Benjamin's* interference with *Jackson's* arrangements at Romney—was preparing for Milroy and Schenck, who were approaching with 6,000 men from Frémont's West Virginian Army, which, with headquarters at Franklin, totalled 16,000, when

joined (on May 11) by Blenker's Division. The idea of this Federal general was to capture Staunton, a Confederate dépôt, in concert with Banks, secure there the Virginia Central Railway, and thence move to Knoxville in East Tennessee—a project very dear to President Lincoln.

Meantime, McClellan, having embarked at Washington, March 17, landed, April 2, at Fort Monroe with 58,000 men and 100 guns—namely, Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's II. Corps, Porter and Hamilton's Divisions of Heintzelman's III. Corps, Keyes' IV. Corps (of which Casey's Division was as yet unable to move), and the Reserve, consisting of Sykes' Regular Brigade, the Regular Artillery Reserve, and Stoneman's Cavalry.

He then reckoned not only on McDowell's 40,000 troops landing on the left bank of the River York, and thus dealing with Gloucester and turning Yorktown, but also on the fleet, which, however, gave no help, owing to some misunderstanding, and to the necessity of watching the *Merrimac*; and indeed Flag-Officer Goldsborough was fully occupied, nor could his vessels have in any case tackled the elevated batteries at Gloucester and Yorktown (note the want of co-operation at Walcheren, 1809, and the hearty co-operation at the Ya-lu, 1904). He therefore had to rely only on the troops, who on April 4 moved thus:—Right Wing: The two divisions of Heintzelman's III.

Corps, Averill's Cavalry, and Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's II. Corps—*via* Big Bethel and Cockle-town on Yorktown; Left wing: Couch's and Smith's Divisions of Keyes' IV. Corps and a small body of regular cavalry—*via* Young's Mill and Warwick Court House, south-east of Lee's Mill; Reserve: Hunt's Regular Artillery, Stoneman's Cavalry, and Sykes' Regular Infantry Brigade—halted at Big Bethel.

On April 5 the Federal right appeared before Yorktown; but the Federal left failed to reach its objective, Halfway House, a point between Yorktown and Williamsburg which would have isolated the former place, and in fact it covered only 5 miles, being checked by thirty-six hours' rain and by the Confederate works at Lee's Mill. Then followed a month's delay on McClellan's part—April 5 to May 3—whilst in front of him stood a Confederate containing force of 13,000 men under *General J. B. Magruder*. This officer held three lines of defence—(1) a line south of Warwick Court House and 7 miles south of Yorktown from Ship's Point to the mouth of the Warwick River, protected on its right by the *Merrimac*, and on its left by Yorktown and Gloucester, though not effectually; and therefore, on March 1, he had retired to his (2) line, which ran for 12 miles, Yorktown—Warwick River—Mulberry Island. Line (3) was at Williamsburg, 11 miles higher up.

As to the (2) line, its left was well protected

by Gloucester and Yorktown, at which latter place two redoubts had been added to the old British entrenchments of 1781; $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the south ran the Warwick River, which, twenty to thirty yards wide, flows south to the River James. On its banks were two mills with dams—namely, Wynne's Mill, 3 miles from Yorktown, and Lee's Mill, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Yorktown. In addition were three other dams—Upper Dam above Wynne's Mill, Dam No. 1, and Dam No. 2 between the two mills—which, constructed by *Magruder*, backed up the water so as to be unfordable. Each dam was covered by artillery and earthworks, and along the rear of the line ran a military road; at Lee's Mill in particular were strong fortifications, and between the two mills lay a forest on the right bank. To this line led three roads—(1) Warwick road to Lee's Mill, (2) a road to Wynne's Mill, (3) Yorktown road.

McClellan was ignorant not only of this formidable line and of *Magruder's* scanty numbers, but also of the topography of the Peninsula, for he relied on the incorrect map by Colonel Cram, engineer at Fort Monroe, which map represented the Warwick River as running nearly parallel with the road up the Peninsula, instead of running across it from Yorktown. But McClellan's worst error was in expecting to surround Yorktown (as Washington had surrounded it in 1781), and in expecting that his left would easily cut in between

that place and Williamsburg, because *Magruder* was sure to hold the line from York River to James River, and not to shut himself up in Yorktown.

The Northern commander's delay, though he had five or six times as many troops as his opponent, can be explained only by his constant hope that the President would ultimately allow McDowell to be transported to the left bank of the York River, where his presence would compel the Confederate detachment to retire. The President, however, not agreeing with McClellan's idea that Banks' Shenandoah troops could be looked on as protecting Washington, rightly from his point of view retained McDowell's corps south of the capital, April 3; this was the first retention of McDowell, and was caused by the Battle of Kernstown. Military writers say that to reinforce McClellan with McDowell was the best way of protecting Washington; Ropes, however, disagrees. On April 5 the general was informed of this retention, which no doubt seriously hampered his plans, but even as it was, with the great superiority he possessed, he should between April 5 and 10 have crushed *Magruder*. The fact is that, as usual with him, he over-estimated *Magruder's* numbers, and on the last-named date *General Joseph E. Johnston's* men—*e.g. D. H. Hill's* Division—began to arrive, though the general himself did not appear till April 15, when he assumed command of *Magruder* in the Peninsula and of *Huger* at Norfolk.

McClellan, instead of attacking, clung to his flanking operations along the left of the York River, and for this purpose asked for Franklin's Division of McDowell's corps to deal with Gloucester. Accordingly, on April 20, Franklin's Division reached Cheeseman's Creek near Ship Point below Yorktown, and consumed fourteen days in making arrangements for landing on the Gloucester side, and by that time Gloucester had been evacuated, and so Franklin did not land north of the York River.

During this month, April 5 to May 3, McClellan, fearing to assail the Warwick River, besieged Yorktown, for which he was prepared, because he had a siege train. He did indeed make one effort to break the line of the river—namely, on April 16, when General William F. Smith's Division of Keyes' IV. Corps crossed midway between Lee's and Wynne's Mills, but had to retire; the Confederates employed rifle-pits, and the attack lacked vigour.

Details of the Action on April 16.—This action occurred at Dam No. 2—Dam No. 1 in Webb's "Peninsula"—midway between the two mills. The dam was covered by a one-gun Confederate battery. Smith reconnoitered with some troops, who fired on the enemy; meantime Lieutenant Noyes crossed the Warwick River below the dam within 50 yards of the Confederate works, and reported to McClellan, whereupon Smith pushed

200 men of the 3rd Vermont across under Captain Harrington, who, under a close fire, gained the Confederate rifle-pits and held them for half an hour, but, as the enemy came up, Harrington, about 4 p.m., had to recross the river, with a loss of 75 men.

A little later Colonel Lord at the same place, being met by a heavy fire, could not reach the rifle-pits and retired; Colonel Stoughton also made an abortive attempt at the dam. The whole operation was not vigorous enough to succeed. Ropes says that Smith would have succeeded but for McClellan's restraint. Note the failure to support Harrington, and compare the similar cases of the Alma, 1854, and of Upton's attack at Spottsylvania, 1864.

All this time the siege of Yorktown was being skilfully conducted, fire being opened on May 1, and the fleet watching the *Merrimac* in the James River; and on May 3 *General Johnston*, having gained a month, wisely abandoned Yorktown, the Warwick River, and Gloucester. Thus the President's action and Franklin's delay led to failure on the Gloucester side, and McClellan's delay to failure on the Yorktown side. For information purposes the latter employed Mr. Pinkerton's Agency, the accuracy of whose reports may be judged by one case—it reported the numbers of the Confederates on May 3 as 120,000; they were 53,000.

The Confederates retired on Williamsburg,

and on May 4 the Federals followed, Stoneman's cavalry encountering *General J. E. B. Stuart*, the celebrated Southern horseman, at the thirteen redoubts (Fort Magruder, etc.), which stretched east of Williamsburg, right across the Peninsula. The infantry came up under the temporary command of Sumner of the II. Corps, McClellan having stopped at Yorktown to superintend the embarkation of Franklin's Division, which had landed on May 3, of Porter's Division, and of the two divisions of Sumner's II. Corps, for transit up the York River. Sumner directed his left, *i.e.* Keyes' IV. Corps, by the Lee's Mill Road, and formed his right of Hooker's Division and Kearney's Division of Heintzelman's III. Corps. Smith's Division of the IV. Corps, stopped at Skiff Creek by a burnt bridge, turned to its right into the road at Halfway House, and thus got into the way of Hooker, who, in consequence, bent to his left and took the Hampton road, which road Smith was to have taken; whether this affected the pursuit is a matter of doubt. That night the Federals were in presence of the enemy.

The Confederate troops present were: *General Longstreet's* Division in six brigades with 22 guns, *General D. H. Hill's* Division in four brigades, and *General J. E. B. Stuart's* Cavalry Brigade in four regiments with one battery. Note the Confederates had not yet adopted the Army Corps organisation.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG, MAY 5

This battle was fought by Sumner on the one side, and by *Longstreet* on the other, *Johnston* allowing him to command. It was without a plan, and without much result; and some blame McClellan for being absent, some blame Sumner for bad leading. Hooker, acting on orders received from McClellan at Yorktown—note this curious idea of discipline—began the battle at 7.30 a.m., without reference to Sumner, pressing on in spite of mud and rain. Before him was Fort Magruder, at the junction of the left or Hampton road with the Yorktown road, on which was Smith; on either side of Fort Magruder were several redoubts resting on two creeks, with a clearing in front, and these formed a strong barrier. The approach was bad for the Federals; the woods impeded their artillery, and the little clearings were full of Confederate rifle-pits.

At 9 a.m. Fort Magruder was silenced, and Hooker, by his right, communicated with the troops on the Yorktown road; but at 11 a.m. *Longstreet's* Division, issuing from Fort Magruder, fell on Hooker's centre and left so fiercely that at 11.30 a.m. the latter sent to Heintzelman, his corps commander, for reinforcements. The despatch was handed to Sumner, who ordered Kearney's Division of the III. Corps to reinforce Hooker, though Casey's Division of Keyes'

May 6
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IV. Corps was nearer. In fact, Hooker struggled without support from 7.30 a.m. to 12 noon, and it was not till 2 p.m. that Kearney arrived in direct support, with Couch on the right flank.

Hooker's isolation was due to Sumner's idea of turning the enemy's left. Informed that a redoubt on the Confederate left covering Queen's Creek seemed abandoned, he sent Hancock's brigade of Smith's Division against it. Hancock crossed the dam and occupied the work about 12 noon, *Longstreet's* attention being occupied by Hooker. Hancock attacked, and took two or three other works in his front, but retired on the original redoubt as he got no reinforcements; late in the afternoon *Johnston* (Webb's "*Peninsula*," p. 79) ordered *D. H. Hill* and *Early* to drive away Hancock, who, however, inflicted loss on them to the number of 400; at 5 p.m. Casey arrived in rear of Couch, and General McClellan appeared on the field. The combatants remained all night facing each other.

Tactical Comments.—The tactics were not good. Sumner was distracted by Hooker's serious fighting; he could not reinforce Hancock from Smith, for, until Couch appeared, Smith alone formed the centre. Hooker's peril on the left baffled Sumner's plan on the right. There was want of concerted action, and the only excellent operation was Hancock's vigorous attack. The work of the Federal Staff was not effectual; the Confederates

were not pressed hard enough, because the men were tired, rations and ammunition ran short, and mud hampered any rapid movement. The Federals lost 2,283 men and 5 guns ; the Confederates lost 1,560 men.

CHAPTER VI

THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN AFTER KERNSTOWN

MEANTIME, in the Valley, Banks, with the Divisions of Williams and Shields, 20,000 strong, advanced to Harrisonburg; *Jackson*, with a force now raised to 6,000, of whom one-third were cavalry, rapidly retiring to Swift Run Gap in Elk Run Valley, and transferring his base from Staunton to Gordonsville. He thus connected with *Ewell's* 8,000 men whom *Johnston*, during his retirement on Richmond, had left at Stanardsville, and also menaced Banks' flank if the latter made any move on Staunton. *President Davis* on *Lee's* advice, in view of the fact that McDowell on April 19 moved his corps—to which Abercrombie at Manassas Junction had been transferred from Banks—on Fredericksburg with the obvious intention of co-operating with McClellan in the Peninsula, placed *Ewell* and *Edward Johnson*, April 29, under *Jackson's* command. At this period the combatants were thus posted: McClellan near Yorktown opposing *Johnston* and *Magruder*, McDowell at Fredericksburg opposing

General J. R. Anderson's containing force of 12,000 men, *Ewell* at Stanardsville, *Edward Johnson* near Staunton, and *Jackson* at Swift Run Gap; this last officer had to deal with Saxton (7,000) at Harper's Ferry, Banks at Harrisonburg, and Frémont at Franklin with an advanced guard under Milroy and Schenck moving against *Edward Johnson*.

Generals Lee and *Jackson* then discussed three possible lines of action which would relieve the situation, viz. : (1) Leave *Ewell* in Swift Run Gap to hold Banks, whilst *Jackson* with *Edward Johnson* attacked Milroy; (2) *Jackson* and *Ewell* to operate against Banks' rear by the Luray-Newmarket road; (3) *Jackson* and *Ewell* to operate against Banks' rear by moving east of the Blue Ridge and then through the Manassas Gap. The first course was preferred, mainly because Frémont's troops, though farther off, were less concentrated than Banks', and *Ewell*, having been brought up to Swift Run Gap, *Jackson* marched his own force up river to Port Republic, then through Brown's Gap to Mechum's Station (as if bound for Richmond), and on by rail to Staunton: this difficult route was selected with a view of taking Milroy by surprise, and also of mystifying Banks. Another, and perhaps unintended, effect of the movement on Mechum's Station was that the President, in alarm for the capital, halted McDowell at Fredericksburg and transferred Shields' Division

from Banks to that officer. This the second retention of McDowell was ordered on May 3.

Jackson, moving west from Staunton, joined *Edward Johnson*, and on May 8 they struck Frémont's advanced troops under Milroy and Schenck in the Battle of McDowell Village. That village is approached by the road from Staunton running in a defile between Sitlington's Hill on the south and Hull's Hill on the north, and crossing the Bull Pasture River by a bridge raked by four Federal guns. On Hull's Hill were some Federal rifles with two guns, but the distance was too great for them; on rising ground west of the bridge were some infantry and a battery; troops lay on the river-bank and round McDowell. Sitlington's Hill was a fine position for his guns, but *Jackson* would not bring them up because—(1) he wanted to conceal his numbers; (2) it was difficult to drag them up; (3) in case of defeat they would be lost; (4) he meant to send during the night a turning force with guns north-east round Hull's Hill, cut Milroy's retreat to Franklin, and crush him between his own and the turning force. In fact, he merely meant to contain the enemy on the 8th, but Milroy wisely took the offensive, crossing his men by the bridge in order to seize Sitlington's Hill. *Jackson*, however, occupied the crest in a pronounced curve with the convexity towards the Federals, and on this hill desperate fighting followed, the steepness of the height

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giving the usual advantage to the attack and the usual disadvantage to the defence. The battle lasted from 4.30 to 8.30 p.m., when the Federals retired. Two of their guns over the river and one on Hull's Hill had fired all the time, but without any effect. The numbers on either side were about 6,000, and the attacker lost fewer men, the figures being 498 Confederates and 256 Federals. There was no immediate pursuit, because cavalry could not act in that terrain; and Milroy and Schenck rapidly fell back on Frémont at Franklin, covered by the smoke of the forests which they fired, as was done in Portugal in 1811, and by Tantia Topi in the Mutiny, and by Botha in 1900; the Confederate general followed without much effect. Meantime, in the Yorktown Peninsula *Johnston* had retired before McClellan, whilst the Rivers York and James passed under Federal control, the Southern vessel *Merrimac* having been destroyed on May 11. This famous vessel had been sunk by the Federals when they abandoned Norfolk; the Confederates raised and re-fitted her as an ironclad. On March 8, 1862, in Hampton Roads she damaged the Federal vessels, but on March 9 the Federal ironclad appeared and neutralised her.

Jackson then countermarched and, *via* Lebanon Springs, made for Harrisonburg, whence Banks had fallen back on Strasburg, *Jackson* taking care to render impassable all roads by which

Frémont, whom Blenker joined May 11, could reach the southern part of the valley, and thus isolating Banks. The fact was that the President had lost faith in Banks and so Shields' Division—11,000 strong—was on May 12 marched off *via* Front Royal to join McDowell at Fredericksburg, and Banks himself with his remaining division under Williams, whose position at Harrisonburg was too exposed, was directed on Strasburg, which place he reached on May 13. It would have been wiser to fall back on Winchester and hold Strasburg and Front Royal with detachments, for thus Banks would have escaped the influence of the parallel obstacle, the Massanuttons. It is, moreover, curious that this reinforcing of McDowell was the undoing of McClellan's plan, because delay was necessary to get supplies for Shields, and in the interval *Jackson* won Front Royal.

In the middle of May the Federals were full of hope. New Orleans had fallen, May 1, 1862; the Battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862, had given them the control of the Upper Mississippi River; McClellan was nearing Richmond, the Federal gunboats on the James River had to be checked by a boom constructed at Drewry's Bluff; McDowell, plus Shields, was preparing to move from Fredericksburg on Richmond, for the President had regained courage when *Jackson* had marched westwards. The question was,

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Would *Jackson's* counterstroke at Banks save the situation?

That general, joined by half *Ewell* from Swift Run Gap, passed through Harrisonburg on to Newmarket, whilst the other half of *Ewell* moved on Luray; total numbers about 16,000 or 17,000, including 1,200 cavalry and 48 guns. *Jackson*, having despatched *Ashby's* cavalry down the turnpike to act as a screen in front of Banks, then turned east over the Massanuttons and joined *Ewell* at Luray, whence the whole army marched down the Luray or Page road towards Front Royal, where was Colonel Kenly with a detachment from Banks of 1,000 men and 2 guns, having no scouts up the Luray Valley. The latter, with about 6,800 men and 16 guns, 2,000 being cavalry, lay entrenched at Strasburg, expecting an attack from the south; he occupied Winchester with a detachment of 1,500 men. On May 23 took place the combat of Front Royal. *Jackson's* foot fell on Kenly's front, whilst Colonel *Flournoy*, with 250 horse, turned his right, and, as Kenly fled north through Cedarville along the Winchester road, *Flournoy* broke both cavalry and infantry, capturing 600 of the latter, with 2 guns. Kenly was annihilated. Meantime *Ashby* (who from in front of Strasburg had rejoined *Jackson* by difficult paths over the Massanuttons) had moved more to the left and cut the railway half-way between Strasburg and

Front Royal. In this combat note the effect of surprise and of cavalry action—Kenly had no cavalry at first (two companies joined during the combat).

Banks at Strasburg had four courses open to him : (1) Stop at Strasburg and wait for Frémont from Franklin ; (2) break through *Jackson* at Front Royal ; (3) retire on Winchester : (4) cross the Little North Mountain to the River Potomac. He chose the third course, and moved, on May 24, along the Winchester road, losing on the way large supplies. *Jackson* himself with *Ashby* pursued by the turnpike, whilst *Ewell* took the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; but the chase was not so effective as it should have been, because *Ashby's* men dispersed in order to pillage.

Next day, May 25, saw the Battle of Winchester. In this battle the numbers, according to Allan's "Valley Campaign," were 6,400 Federals, 16,000 Confederates.

The Division of General Williams consisted of two infantry brigades, *i.e.* of Donnelly's Brigade of three regiments (numbering 1,700), and of Gordon's Brigade of five regiments (numbering 2,958). It also included 1,500 cavalry under Broadhead and Hatch. The guns numbered 16 in three batteries.

The Division of *General Jackson* consisted of three infantry brigades, under *Winder*, *Campbell*, and *Taliaferro* respectively.

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The Division of *General Ewell* consisted of four brigades, under *Taylor*, *Trimble*, *Elzey*, and *Scott* respectively.

The cavalry were commanded by *Ashby* and *Stuart*. As to guns, there were 48 in eleven batteries.

The Federal position was well chosen, their right on the turnpike and west of it, their left on the Front Royal road; "the line of defence ran along a broken ridge, lined in many places with stout stone walls, and protected in front by the winding reaches of Abraham's Creek" (Henderson, vol. i. p. 338). Early in the morning the Stonewall Brigade attacked Banks' right in a severe contest, for the enemy were ably led by General Gordon: *Ewell* also moved up to strike, whilst *Jackson* carried out a turning movement against Gordon's right. In this quarter a charge of Federal cavalry cost them dear; and then the turning force, the Stonewall men and the reserve, swept the Federals through the streets of Winchester along the road to Williamsport on the River Potomac. They escaped with less loss than might be expected, because *Ashby* had not yet been able to get his men in from their pillaging, and because *Ewell's* cavalry leader (*Stuart*) refused to pursue until *Jackson's* order to do so came to him through *Ewell*. That night and next day Banks crossed the Potomac. He should not have fought, and his utter rout had

great strategic results—it had paralysed McClellan's plan of campaign and saved Richmond; it alarmed President Lincoln, and McDowell was withdrawn for the third time (on May 24 in consequence of Front Royal) from helping McClellan, and ordered to send Shields' Division to co-operate in the Valley with Frémont in intercepting *Jackson*—the former with 10,000 *viâ* Front Royal, the latter with 15,000 *viâ* Wardensville. Frémont was at first on May 24 directed on Harrisonburg. McDowell and McClellan objected, the former observing that the main thing was to mass large forces against Richmond; Frémont soon found he could not reach Harrisonburg by roads which Jackson had obstructed, and therefore chose the above-named route. Ropes condemns this plan of the President, especially the stopping of McDowell's march southwards from Fredericksburg, originally ordered for May 26, and says a chance of capturing Richmond was thrown away, for McDowell would have raised McClellan to 150,000 (to arrive at effective numbers in the case of the Federals you must deduct one-fifth).

On his side, *Jackson*, knowing Saxton with 7,000 men was at Harper's Ferry, moved on the place slowly, because he had to arrange about stores captured at Winchester. He then—May 29—learnt of the converging movements of Frémont and Shields to intercept him at Strasburg, and

his unusual slowness at this period gave them some chance. In fact, his 16,000 men were threatened not only by Frémont and Shields with their 25,000, but also by Banks' 7,000, Saxton's 7,000, and by the rest of McDowell, *i.e.* 20,000 (not reckoning Shields or McCall, the latter's division being about to join McClellan by water), who were moving along the Manassas Gap railway in rear of Shields. The distances were: Shields 12 miles from Strasburg, Frémont 20 miles, *Jackson* at Winchester 18 miles, with his Stonewall Brigade near Harper's Ferry, 43 miles. The Southern general, therefore, to escape the blow, rapidly countermarched through Winchester and Strasburg, June 1; whilst Frémont and Shields slowly approached the latter place—slowly, because each was ignorant of the other's movements. Their indecision was fatal, and *Jackson* avoided the blow without the loss of a waggon. The Federal failure illustrates not only the evil of divided command, but also the selection of a point of interception too near the enemy's army, the same error as the French Emperor committed in 1814 when he struck against Prince Schwartzberg's rear at Plancy. The retreat up the turnpike was viewed by Shields and Frémont as they came into connection at Strasburg.

The two Federal generals then pursued, Frémont by the turnpike, and Shields by the Luray road, effectually separated by the parallel obstacles

of the Massanuttons and the South Fork, for *Jackson* took care to burn the bridges of White House, Columbia, and Conrad's Store, and to secure the only remaining bridge of Port Republic with a party of cavalry. On the main road the retreat was covered by *Ashby* fiercely contesting with Frémont's horsemen, but on June 6 that intrepid sabreur met his death in an action near Harrisonburg : it was a heavy loss for the South. His containing operations may well be likened to Craufurd's action on the River Coa, 1810, with 4,500 men against Masséna's army.

Jackson's force numbered about 13,000, of whom part under *Ewell* occupied Cross Keys, and part under the general himself held Port Republic, i.e. his trains in Port Republic and the troops on the heights west of the South Fork, with cavalry watching either Federal general, and with a signal station on the southern end of the Massanuttons ; whilst Frémont at Harrisonburg did not locate the enemy till the evening of June 7, and Shields on the Luray road, with his brigades dangerously strung out (because he heard that *Longstreet* might burst into the Valley from the east), was hurrying up, expecting to crush the Confederate leader between himself and his coadjutor. *Jackson*, on interior lines, planned to defeat them in detail, and the terrain suited his purpose : the North and South Rivers forming the South Fork join at Port Republic ; over the

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North River was the Port Republic bridge, but over the South River were only two difficult fords; and north of Port Republic on the west bank bluffs commanded the eastern bank. The plan was to hold Frémont on the west, and to crush Shields on the east, then recross and deal with Frémont; this plan, however, was thrown out by Frémont's advance against *Ewell* at Cross Keys on June 8 (Battle of Cross Keys). *Ewell* had about 6,000, Frémont about 12,000, with far more guns and cavalry. Meantime a serious incident had occurred at Port Republic: Shields' advanced troops had moved unseen through the forest (*Jackson's* signallers on the mountain had been recalled, and his cavalry scouts failed), and, fording the South River, entered Port Republic and nearly captured their redoubted adversary. His trains were in danger, but, having galloped across the bridge, he brought up troops and cleared the town, driving Shields' men over the South River to Lewiston.

At Cross Keys Frémont did not act vigorously. He moved his left against *Ewell's* right in the thickets: the Confederate brigadier allowed them to approach within sixty paces before he fired. The Federals retired, and, as they did not seem inclined to attack again, the brigadier outflanked their left and drove it back on their guns. The defeat of his left caused Frémont to withdraw his right and centre. The approach of night

Map 9

forbade any idea of pursuit of the repulsed army. The tactical lessons are: Folly of not using one's full strength; fire-discipline, and counter-stroke.

Jackson's "audacious" (Allan) plan for next day, June 9, was to hold Frémont on the west with part of his force, rout Shields' advanced guard with his main body, then recross and defeat Frémont; he therefore that night constructed a bridge of waggons across the South River at Port Republic.

10 ✓
June 9 saw the Battle of Port Republic. In this battle the Confederates numbered at first 1,200, but as the day wore on they had 6,000 in the field; whilst Shields' advanced guard, 3,000 to 4,000 strong, held a strong position—their right on the South Fork, centre at Lewiston or Lewis House, their left across the Luray road and in the woods; several guns strengthened their centre and left. The Federal commander, Tyler, was vigorous, and *Jackson's* first attack with 1,200 men against Tyler's right was severely repulsed. The reinforcements that arrived across the waggon bridge *Jackson* detached to his right through the woods in order to turn Tyler's left and threaten his guns. Meantime *Ewell* was with difficulty crossing the awkward waggon bridge, and *Jackson's* original force of 1,200—*i.e.* the Stonewall Brigade, under *Winder*, on the left between the Luray road and the South Fork—was hardly pressed by

the energetic Tyler, and finally broken and forced back. Part of *Ewell* coming up vainly assailed the left of the attacking Federals; the day seemed lost, when *Jackson's* right, passing through the woods, fell on Tyler's left, carried his guns, and endangered his retreat, though not without desperate fighting. Tyler at once recalled his victorious right. A general advance drove him and Shields in retreat north along the Luray road.

Jackson had soon seen that he could not hope to beat Frémont as well as Tyler, and, during the contest with the latter, he retired the force in front of Frémont over the Port Republic Bridge, which was then burnt. The Federal general slowly occupied the heights west of the South Fork, but not till the battle was over. It was to avoid the fire of his batteries that *Jackson* took the forest path to Brown's Gap, which he reached at midnight.

At Port Republic the Confederate general attacked too soon, and with insufficient numbers; strategically, however, this battle and the preceding one of Cross Keys had great results. McDowell, who had again, on *Jackson* retiring up the valley, been ordered to move towards McClellan, was for the fourth time held back; nor did McClellan himself fail to feel the effect of *Jackson's* success. He had leisurely followed *Johnston's* leisurely retreat from Williamsburg on Richmond. His great army, 110,000 strong, based on White

House, lay on either side of the River Chickahominy waiting for McDowell—an unfavourable position, and yet hardly to be avoided if co-operation with McDowell was to be secured. It was in this position that on May 31 and June 1 he was heavily attacked by *Johnston* in the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks; in the course of these indecisive actions *Johnston* was wounded, and *Lee* became General-in-Chief in the field. Thus *Jackson*, by causing McDowell to be retained, compelled McClellan to occupy an unfavourable position.

Lee and *Jackson* then planned for the latter to march to Richmond and strike McClellan on his right, which, as White House was his base, was his strategic flank; whilst *Lee* himself contained the enemy's left on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy River. With this end in view, it was needful to keep off McDowell and to induce Frémont to believe that *Jackson* was pursuing in person; reinforcements, therefore, were ostentatiously despatched from Richmond westwards; *Jackson's* own cavalry followed Frémont far down the valley, and in all ways he tried to create the impression that he desired. Meantime for five days he rested his infantry at Mount Meridian, and then, starting on June 17, rapidly marched for Richmond, *viâ* Gordonsville, reaching Ashland Station June 25. So ignorant were the Northern generals of the move, that McDowell was now for

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the fifth and last time withdrawn from McClellan and placed with Frémont and Banks under General Pope, whose orders were to act against *Stonewall Jackson* in the Gordonsville district; but on June 26 McClellan learnt that his ubiquitous foe was on his right flank.

CHAPTER VII

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES

I WILL now resume the account of McClellan's Peninsular operations from the Battle of Williamsburg (May 5) to their close. The Division of Franklin, that of Porter, and the II. Corps of Sumner proceeded in transports up river to West Point, near which place they had a brush with the retiring Confederates on May 7. The retreat of the latter over the Chickahominy towards Richmond, and their abandonment of Norfolk, necessitated the destruction, on May 11, of the *Merrimac*, which could not ascend the James, and also opened that river to Federal gunboats as far as the enemy's works at Drewry's Bluff.

The Federals, meantime marching up the Peninsula and connecting with their troops at West Point, established themselves by May 21 on either side of the railway east of the Chickahominy, with their base at White House and within twelve miles of Richmond—on the right, the two newly formed army corps, the V. under

Porter and the VI. under Franklin; in the centre, Sumner's II. Corps; on the left, Keyes' IV. Corps; in reserve, Heintzelman's III. Corps; and, on the extreme right, Stoneman's cavalry. McClellan states that his position, based on the Pamunkey instead of one based on the James, was forced on him by the fact that McDowell was to join him by land and not by water. The last-named general, reinforced by Shields' Division of Banks' Shenandoah Army up to 40,000 men, with 100 guns, had been, as we have seen, on May 17, ordered by the President to move *via* Culpeper Court House and Fredericksburg on Richmond. In his path lay only a containing force of 12,000 Confederates under *Generals Branch* and *J. R. Anderson*; but as supplies for Shields were lacking, McDowell delayed his march and never resumed it, because of the effect of the action of Front Royal (May 23). To render a junction with this general eventually possible, and to secure his own right flank, McClellan, however, on May 27, despatched General Porter with 12,000 men, *via* Mechanicsville, on Hanover Court House, near which place, after a sharp engagement with *Branch's* men, he destroyed several bridges and much of the railways, and then returned.

McClellan had meantime, that is between May 23 and 25, crossed part of his army over the Chickahominy, a river forty-five feet wide,

three deep, lined with muddy banks and liable to floods. This stream then divided the 110,000 Federals and their 280 guns—the left wing lay west of the stream, namely, Keyes' IV. Corps at Seven Pines, and Heintzelman's III. Corps at Savage's Station; the right wing lay east of the stream, namely, the Corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter at Gaines Mill.

On the other side, *General Johnston*, dreading the approach of McDowell, at first meditated a blow on McClellan's right, and, with this object, called up *Huger's* Norfolk troops from Petersburg, but on hearing (May 29) from *Stuart* of McDowell's recall, decided to strike McClellan's left. The result was the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, May 31 and June 1. On the former day the two Federal corps were driven back, but the arrival of Sumner's II. Corps from the eastern bank checked the Confederate advance. On the latter day the Federals assumed the offensive and regained their old position. Thus the battle had no effect, except that a severe wound incapacitated *Johnston* and transferred the command of the Army of Northern Virginia to the celebrated *Robert E. Lee*.

There then ensued a pause in the operations, due to the terrible weather, which broke the Federal bridges and caused the three corps of the left wing to depend solely on the railway bridge—in fact, now McClellan realised how

dangerous is a position astride a river in the presence of an able antagonist.

During the first half of June the President reinforced McClellan by sending him by water McCall's Division of 10,000 men, from McDowell, and 11,000 other troops; whilst *President Davis* also strengthened *Lee* with 20,000 men from the Southern States; and, on the 12th, *Stuart*, with 1,200 cavalry and horse artillery, started on his famous Pamunkey expedition *via* Ashland, Hanover Court House, and Tunstall's Station, right round McClellan's rear, then over the Chickahominy, and back to Richmond along the James River road. This raid inflicted great damage on the Federal telegraphs and railroads, and sensibly lowered McClellan's prestige, though, unfortunately for *Lee*, it also turned McClellan's attention, more than ever, to the necessity of transferring his base from White House to the River James. Other reasons for this change of base have been alleged—the state of the roads to White House and the appearance of *Jackson* on June 26.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES, JUNE 25 TO JULY I

On June 25, the bridges having been repaired, the Federals, 110,000 strong, of whom 90,000 were effectives, were thus posted: south of the Chickahominy, near Seven Pines, Franklin's VI. Corps on the right, Sumner's II. Corps in the

centre, Heintzelman's III. Corps on the left, Keyes' IV. Corps in reserve; north of the Chickahominy, near Gaines Mill, Porter's V. Corps, with McCall's Division, at Mechanicsville. To oppose them, *Lee* had 85,000 in nine divisions under *Jackson*, *Longstreet*, *A. P. Hill*, *D. H. Hill*, *Magruder*, *Huger*, *Whiting*, *Ewell*, and *Holmes*, with *Stuart's* cavalry, of whom *Jackson* this day was at Ashland Station, and the others were east and north-east of Richmond.

On June 26 took place the first of the Seven Days' Battles—the *Battle of Mechanicsville*. McCall there held a strong position, and as *Jackson*, owing to bad maps, failed to connect, *A. P. Hill*, with 14,000 men, foolishly crossed the Chickahominy and fought a stiff but indecisive action. None the less the knowledge that *Jackson* was on his right rear compelled McClellan, on June 27, to retire McCall on Porter at Gaines Mill (note that Porter then formed front to a flank). In the *Battle of Gaines Mill or Cold Harbour*, Porter and McCall, 23,000 strong, were attacked from the west by six divisions, 50,000 strong (that is, all *Lee's* troops, except *Magruder*, *Huger*, and *Holmes*, who, 27,000 strong, south of the river, skilfully contained the Federal left, 67,000 strong), the divisions of *Jackson* and *D. H. Hill* circling round the Federal right flank. A Federal cavalry charge led, says General Porter, to the loss of

22 Federal guns, and the whole force, except always Sykes' regulars, was thrown into disorder, and its retreat over the Chickahominy secured only by the timely arrival of reinforcements from the corps south of the river. It has been suggested that McClellan could, with his powerful left, this day, or any other day since June 1, have burst into Richmond; but in truth *Lee* had wrested the initiative from the cautious Federal commander, who also far over-estimated the Southern numbers.

On June 28 McClellan carried out his previously conceived change of base from White House to Harrison's Landing on the James; at the former place stores were burnt and railway trains fully loaded run into the river, whilst 5,000 waggons, the reserve artillery, and 2,500 cattle moved across the Chickahominy at Jones' Bridge *en route* for the new base, and transports plied along the York and James rivers; the whole operation was immensely costly, but there was time to do it, because *Lee* was convinced that his opponent would retreat on Fort Monroe, and accordingly allowed *Stuart* to pursue Stoneman's cavalry, *viâ* White House, an error which saved McClellan.

From June 29 to July 1 the Federal Army was struggling to Malvern Hill pressed by the Confederates, who did not, however, succeed in cutting them off from their new base, partly because *Stuart* was absent, partly because *Jackson*

unaccountably delayed in crossing the Chickahominy, partly because of the Northerners' devotion to their beloved chief, and partly because of McClellan's undoubted skill. Numerous stiff engagements occurred, *e.g. Savage's Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale*, in none of which was the decision decidedly in favour of *Lee's* men, and the general result was that all the Federal forces attained Malvern Hill on July 1, which day saw the last of the Seven Days' Battles, *i.e. Malvern Hill or Crew's Farm*, which is generally considered an error on *Lee's* part; he attacked, piecemeal, an enemy holding a very strong position, with far superior artillery and gunboats in the river. It should, however, be added that Allan, in his "Army of Northern Virginia," contends that *Lee's* action was sound, because the destruction of the Union Army was worth any risk. The result of the fighting was indecisive, and at the close of the day all the Federals retired on their new base, Harrison's Landing. During all this time, June 28 to July 1, *Stuart*, after pursuing Stoneman and destroying stores at White House, had been sweeping round over the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and from July 2 to July 4 shelled the enemy's camp at Harrison's Landing. The losses in the above engagements were: Confederates, 20,000; Federals, 16,000 and 52 guns.

The above operations give rise to the reflections

that sea-power is an invaluable assistance to effecting a change of base; that, when an army is astride a river, a blow on the farther bank (Seven Pines and Fair Oaks) is nothing like so deadly as a blow on the hither bank (Gaines Mill); that topography is a most important matter—*e.g.* the Federals had mapped out the White Oak Swamp, the Confederates were ignorant of it; and that an army may easily regret the absence of its horsemen.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL JOHN POPE

TOWARDS the end of June the Federal Army of Virginia was formed (see page 71), under General Pope; it consisted of I. Corps under Sigel vice Frémont resigned, II. Corps under Banks, III. Corps under McDowell, with some cavalry under Buford and Bayard—total, 49,500. The general at once set to work to concentrate his separated forces.

On July 11 the supreme command, under the President, of the Union land forces was vested in General Halleck, an incompetent man; and in the middle of that month, as Pope made efforts to break the railway through Gordonsville, *Lee* sent to that district first *Jackson* and soon afterwards *A. P. Hill*, whose united numbers on July 27 were 25,000.

The President now had to decide what to do with McClellan, whom he distrusted for his slowness and his democratic opinions. The best course would have been to direct him to capture

Petersburg, the key of Richmond, and to operate by the James River; but instead of this he instructed, on August 3, that the army should embark for Acquia Creek and Alexandria. In consequence McClellan soon afterwards marched for Fort Monroe, and, to cover his embarkation, General Pope, on August 8, pushed his leading troops—the corps of Banks—on Gordonsville. On the other side, *Jackson* was approaching in a slow march caused by his extreme reticence to his lieutenants, and on August 9 fought Banks in the *Battle of Cedar Mountain*, the latter numbering 8,000 against 20,000. The Federal foolishly took the offensive, which failed, as also did a badly arranged cavalry charge; but the arrival of fresh Federal troops rendered the action a mere tactical triumph for *Jackson*, who at once retired to the south bank of the Rapidan, whilst Pope occupied the north bank. About this time the Federal commander was reinforced by 8,000 men of Burnside's North Carolina force (see page 33), otherwise called Reno's IX. Corps, who came by water to Acquia Creek.

Lee himself, observing McClellan's preparations for embarkation—his army embarked on August 20, except Keyes' IV. Corps, left as garrison at Fort Monroe—placed *D. H. Hill* with 25,000 men at Richmond, and himself, with *Longstreet* and *Stuart*, proceeded to join *Jackson* (total force, 55,000), and thus opened what is styled

THE SECOND MANASSAS OR SECOND BULL RUN
CAMPAIGN, AUGUST 13 TO SEPTEMBER 2

af 11
The Confederate general at first planned a very able turning movement right round Pope's left, which, however, miscarried owing to the capture of *Stuart's* Adjutant-General with a letter showing that *Lee* himself had joined *Jackson*, and owing to a spy's disclosing *Lee's* plan to Pope. The latter, warned in time, wisely fell back along the railroad over the Rappahannock, August 20, to which river *Lee* at once followed. The Federal general possessed the higher bank and more powerful guns; still, on August 22 *General Stuart* succeeded in effecting one of his most remarkable raids. With 1,500 sabres he rode round Pope's right into Catlett's Station, where he did much damage and captured some despatches, and returned, having covered 62 miles in 26 hours.

The river then rose and became impassable for some days, and Pope himself destroyed the railway bridge, whilst on his left arrived, *via* Acquia Creek, 8,000 men from McClellan. On the other side, *Lee*, fearful lest delay should allow time for overwhelming numbers to reach Pope, decided on the daring plan—contrary to one of the leading rules of strategy—of separating in the face of a superior enemy. This was nothing less than despatching *Jackson* and *Stuart*, with 22,500 men, round the Federal right to

Manassas Junction, where the Federal communications would be intercepted. Consequently, on August 25, *Jackson* started on his perilous flank march *viâ* Amissville, Orleans, Salem, and Thorofare Gap, living on the country. The dust betrayed the march to the Federal cavalry, but in Pope's eyes the destination of the Confederate leader was the Shenandoah Valley. On this day the Northerners were further reinforced by 20,000 men from McClellan's Army, namely, Heintzelman's III. Corps by rail from Alexandria, and Porter's V. Corps *viâ* Acquia Creek, whilst at Falmouth on the Rappahannock arrived the rest of Burnside's North Carolina force—4,000 men.

On August 26 Pope, not yet certain as to *Jackson's* destination, and in any event relying on Halleck to protect his line of communications, was surprised by the news that that dangerous antagonist had passed through Thorofare Gap and had seized Manassas Junction with its vast magazines. His connection with Washington now lay through Falmouth and, his direct line being cut, he had, as usual in such cases, three possible courses of action: (1) to escape round the interceptor's outer flank, which would, in this case, mean a movement to the east of the railway, and which was unthinkable with such numbers as Pope possessed, say, 65,000 effectives; (2) burst through by fighting; and (3) to move across the interceptor's communications. Pope

wisely decided on combining the two last courses, and directed his right, or western, wing on Gainesville, and his left, or eastern, wing on Manassas Junction. Note that he could not attack *Lee* because the river was impassable.

On August 27 these orders were executed, and if they had remained unaltered—especially as McDowell on the western flank took the responsibility of despatching a division to close up the Thorofare Gap at its eastern mouth—the result would have been that *Jackson*, unaided, must have fought nearly all Pope's forces, or must have retired in a disastrous retreat *vid* Ashby's Gap into the Valley. Unfortunately, however, for himself the Federal general, convinced that *Jackson* would stop at Manassas Junction, swung round all his western wing on that place, intending, with both his wings, to crush the daring Southerner there (he actually said: "We shall bag the whole crowd"), and yet he knew *Lee* was near Salem, for Buford's cavalry, sent out by McDowell, so reported. As a fact *Jackson* that night fell back from the Junction on to the old battle-field of the First Bull Run, and on August 28 took up a position on an unfinished railway, north of Groveton, with his left at Sudley Springs, in which position he could be joined by *Lee* *vid* Thorofare Gap. When, therefore, Pope reached Manassas Junction he found his bird had flown, and, on vague

information that the Southern general was at Centreville, he directed his whole force on that place. To execute this order the Federal left had to counter-march through Gainesville and then make for Groveton along the turnpike, whilst the right had to cross the Bull Run Fords between the turnpike and the Orange and Alexandria railway. This was on the evening of August 28, and at the same moment *Jackson* lay on the unfinished railway, north of Groveton, and *Lee* was filing through the Thorofare Gap. As the Federal left passed in front of him, *Jackson*, thinking that Pope was in full retreat for Washington, took the offensive—in fact he surprised the Federals, who had not discovered his whereabouts—and brought on the *Battle of Gainesville*, which was a fierce but indecisive struggle. Of this battle Pope took an erroneous view, because he regarded it as an attempt on the part of *Jackson* to escape to the Thorofare Gap—*Jackson* was also in error in supposing Pope to be in retreat—and he therefore arranged for the next day, August 29, a plan by which the Confederate general might be captured, namely, his left would hold him in front, and his right would, from Centreville, come over the Stone Bridge.

On August 29 the Federal general completed his plan by directing the rearmost corps of his right wing—Porter's V. Corps—then at Manassas

Junction, to move on Gainesville and to intercept *Jackson's* retreat. The fatal objection to this plan was that *Lee* was at hand, for Pope, letting the wish be father to the thought, would not credit the nearness of that formidable commander.

BATTLE OF GROVETON

General Porter, now the extreme Federal left, approaching Gainesville at 12 noon, ascertained that *Lee's* troops went through Gainesville that morning, whilst he saw an artillery action in progress between the Federal left near Groveton and *Stonewall Jackson*, but owing to the nature of the country he could effect no real connection with that left. Whether Porter acted rightly or wrongly in remaining inactive during this day on the railway, east of Gainesville, is a point on which opinions differ. Ropes, in "*Army under Pope*," pp. 83-101, acquits Porter, and argues that McDowell was the real culprit; but the question is too complicated for the present work.

Meantime the Federal left and right, at Groveton, and eastwards along the turnpike, were attacking *Jackson* fiercely but indecisively, because Porter could not deliver the blow that Pope expected him to deliver. *Lee* was already debouching on *Jackson's* right flank. The Southern general brought with him *Longstreet's* First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, consisting of 26,500 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, besides artillery, to

assist *Jackson's* Second Corps of the same army; and Ropes considers that the united forces should have attacked this day, August 29, and suggests that the reason for *Lee's* delay is to be found in the menacing position of General Porter. Henderson agrees with Ropes; but Allan differs.

On August 30 took place the decisive *Battle of the Second Manassas or Bull Run*. Pope, still hoping against hope that *Lee's* main body had not arrived, and furious with what he styled Porter's gross disobedience, decided to make another effort to crush *Jackson*—he would have done better to retire on Centreville (compare Meade's action in 1863). Early in the morning Porter, by a night march, joined the main Federal body, whilst *Lee* made no movement, rightly judging that Pope would renew his effort against *Jackson*. About 4 p.m. the Federals moved north of the pike against *Jackson's* position, when *Lee* swept round south of the great road, threatening to seize the all-important Stone Bridge. Seeing this danger Sykes' regulars occupied Henry House Hill, which covered the bridge, but everywhere else in the field the Confederates carried everything before them, *Jackson* springing forward from his railway embankment, and on the extreme right *Stuart's* cavalry charging down the Federal horse "in the most brilliant cavalry combat of the war" (Henderson). The Federal retreat was, however, secured by the regulars, although the

last troops to cross the bridge were Colonel Kane's Pennsylvania Bucktails. In this celebrated battle the loss of the losing side was 26 guns, 9,000 killed and wounded, and 7,000 prisoners.

It should be noted that in causing two separate armies to unite on the battle-field, as *Lee* did in this case, the great Southern general was acting on exterior-line principles, and not, as he usually acted, on interior principles. As to Pope, he should have retired without seriously fighting on Centreville, where, reinforced by Sumner and Franklin, he might have awaited *Lee*.

Late on August 30 Pope regained Centreville, where those two corps joined him, 20,000 strong.

On August 31 *Lee* despatched *Jackson* over the upper Bull Run to sweep round *viâ* Chantilly on Pope's line of communication; but Pope countered this move by retiring on Fairfax Court House, and as *Jackson* came through Chantilly he was strongly resisted in what is called the *Battle of Chantilly or Ox Hill*, September 1. That night the rest of *Lee's* army came up with *Jackson*, and next day, September 2, the campaign closed with the retirement of Pope into Washington and his supersession by McClellan. The total killed and wounded in the campaign were, according to "Battles of the Civil War," 14,462 Federals and 9,474 Confederates.

I may add that it has been suggested that McClellan could, by more promptly sending Sumner and Franklin, have materially helped Pope in the battle; but Ropes considers that if any one is to blame for the delay it is General Halleck, who failed to supply transport, and in any case Pope did not count on these two corps when he opened battle.

CHAPTER IX

*THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG,
SEPTEMBER 2 TO DECEMBER 16, 1862*

UP to September 2 the year 1862 had been unfortunate for the Federals, whose main army at Washington was then reorganised by McClellan, whilst *Lee* moved towards Leesburg. McClellan, ascertaining this fact, handed over the defence of the capital to General Banks with Heintzelman's III. Corps, Sigel's XI. Corps, and garrison troops, altogether about 56,000 men, and himself prepared for the field with Right Wing under Burnside, *i.e.* Hooker's I. Corps and Reno's IX. Corps; Centre under Sumner, *i.e.* Sumner's II. Corps and Mansfield's XII. Corps; Left Wing under Franklin, *i.e.* Couch's Division of Keyes' IV. Corps, Franklin's VI. Corps, and Porter's V. Corps (this corps joined last); cavalry under Pleasonton: total about 100,000 men.

On the other side, *Lee's* Army of Northern Virginia, ill-equipped and sadly in want of boots, consisted of two army corps under *Longstreet* and *Jackson*, and cavalry under *Stuart*—total

about 55,000, including 18,000 under *D. H. Hill* from Richmond. *President Davis* would give no more troops, because he was attending to the western theatre. The Southern commander, fearing the effect of Federal success along the Mississippi and the ever-tightening grip of the Federal vessels, believing in offensive action, trusting to rouse Maryland (it did not to any great extent respond to his call), and desiring to transfer the war to Federal territory, crossed the Potomac at White's Ford between September 4 and 7, and made for Frederick, sending *Stuart's* cavalry on a brief raid to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania. Federal forces at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry were a menace to his communications, which ran to Richmond *via* the Shenandoah Valley, and he would have to deal with them.

McClellan, learning this, moved forward on Frederick, near which place he collected his army about September 13; but, effectually stopped by *Stuart* from getting any accurate intelligence, took no measures to save the Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry forces until he by accident got, on September 13, a Confederate order of September 9, which showed that *Lee* planned to divide his army—half under *Jackson* and *A. P. Hill* to deal with Harper's Ferry, half under *Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill* to retire over the South Mountain on Boonsboro. Then was McClellan's chance for a rapid march against

Longstreet alone ; he had all the 14th, for Harper's Ferry did not surrender till the 15th.

Jackson, crossing the Potomac, drove the Martinsburg Federals into Harper's Ferry and surrounded the latter place, which, on September 15, surrendered with 11,000 men, 73 guns, and immense magazines. Leaving *A. P. Hill's* Division at Harper's Ferry, *Jackson*, by a rapid seventeen-mile night march, reached Sharpsburg early on the 16th.

BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, SEPTEMBER 14

Lee, informed that night (September 13-14) of the loss of his despatch, directed *Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill*, both farther west than Boonsboro, to return and hold the South Mountain. Meantime *McClellan*, instead of moving from Frederick on the night of the 13th, waited till daybreak of the 14th, and then with, for him, unusual rapidity pressed on towards Boonsboro, expecting to interpose between *Lee's* divided forces. The result was the confused combats that are called the Battle of South Mountain, between *McClellan's* advanced troops and troops from *Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill*, as well as some of *Jackson's* men, then on the Maryland Heights, acting against Harper's Ferry. These actions, tactically defeats and strategically victories (compare Kernstown) for the Confederates, did

not save Harper's Ferry, and did not allow McClellan to strike *Lee* in detail.

BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM OR SHARPSBURG,
SEPTEMBER 16-17

On September 15 *Lee*, with *Longstreet*, *D. H. Hill*, and *Stuart's* cavalry, fell back on Sharpsburg, and the Federals followed; on this day McClellan had a chance of crushing half the Confederates, whilst the other half, under *Jackson*, were at Harper's Ferry. *Lee* occupied a strong position, with the Potomac on his flanks and the Antietam in front, on the east bank of which stream lay the Federals.

On September 16 the batteries opened, and on the Confederate side *Jackson* arrived, taking position to the left, *i.e.* north of Sharpsburg, with *Stuart* on the extreme left and *Longstreet* to the right, *i.e.* south of Sharpsburg; *A. P. Hill* was still absent. The Federals stood in two bodies, the southern one being under General Burnside. Palfrey says the Confederates numbered 38,000, the Federals 70,000. This day (the 16th) part of McClellan's right crossed the Antietam, and on September 17 took place the sanguinary Battle of the Antietam or Sharpsburg. Early in the morning the enemy's right fell on *Jackson* in a desperate conflict, both sides losing heavily, and the Southern general displayed conspicuous

tactical skill; the Federals also assailed *Lee's* centre, moving across the Bloody Lane, or Sunken Road. Later on, McClellan's left, crossing the Antietam by a bridge, south-east of Sharpsburg, put the Confederates in great peril, but the sudden onset of *A. P. Hill* (hurrying up from Harper's Ferry) on the hostile column saved the situation.

It is said that if Burnside with the left had attacked at the same time as the right, *Lee* would have been beaten. The fact is, that to fight with a single line of retreat, *i.e. viâ* the Shepherdstown Ford, south-west of Sharpsburg, was a desperate course—*Lee* underrated his opponent.

Next day, as McClellan was being reinforced, *Lee*, crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown Ford, made for Winchester, and thus the battle was a strategic victory for the North, though a tactical success for the South. The cardinal error of the Federal commander had been his delay; he should have attacked on the 15th, when *Lee* had only 20,000 men with 125 guns—exaggerated by McClellan into 50,000—and in any case on the 16th. The losses on the Federal side were 12,000; on the Confederate, 9,500.

Both combatants set to work reorganising, except that *J. E. B. Stuart* made from October 9 to 13 his famous raid into Pennsylvania, *viâ* Chambersburg, right round McClellan's Army.

With 1,800 troopers he crossed at Williamsport, and entering Chambersburg at night seized horses, cut telegraphs, etc., and then, *viâ* Frederick over the River Monocacy, reached the Baltimore and Ohio railway, which he destroyed; hearing the enemy's cavalry were on the alert, he made for the woods and recrossed near the mouth of the Monocacy, having covered 100 miles in 48 hours. This raid gained much information and wore out the Federal cavalry, which had been hard worked by Pope. Late in this month the Union forces, 125,000 strong, crossed to the south bank of the Potomac, east of the Blue Ridge, moving on Warrenton, whereupon *Lee*, who now numbered 70,000, despatched *Longstreet* to Culpeper Court House on the Orange and Alexandria railway, *Jackson* remaining near Strasburg in the Valley. This strategic separation in the face of superior numbers was doubtless daring strategy.

McClellan, "the best commander," says Palfrey, "the Army of the Potomac ever had," was on November 7 unwisely superseded by the incompetent but charming Burnside, whilst Porter, the best officer in the army, was also recalled. The new chief decided to strike at Richmond, along the short line of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway. He therefore rapidly marched down the left bank of the Rappahannock to a point opposite Fredericksburg, where he arrived November 19, his base being at Acquia Creek,

the railway to which place had been broken by *Lee*. The latter general, thoroughly informed by *Stuart*, replied by moving *Longstreet* to Fredericksburg, and by calling up *Jackson* from the Valley to the same place, where he took post on the right of *Longstreet*, to the south of the town. The Confederate position, though immensely strong for defence, especially on the left, afforded no chance for a counterstroke, and on that account *Jackson* objected to it. *Lee* indeed proposed for that reason to retire to the North Anna; but *President Davis* declined to resign territory.

Burnside should now have crossed above Falmouth, but, as it was, on December 11, pontoons were laid by his great army of 110,000 to 120,000 men with 350 guns—all volunteers except Sykes, and some of the artillery—with the help of his array of batteries on the left bank; and next day the Federals crossed; but *Lee* had had time to concentrate his troops, about 78,000 with 250 guns and some heavy guns, *Jackson* on the right, *Longstreet* on the left, and cavalry on either flank. In this case *Lee* entrenched; he had not done so at the Antietam. On December 13 was fought the savage *Battle of Fredericksburg*, in which Burnside's left, under Franklin, made a desperate but unsuccessful attack on *Jackson*; while his right, under Sumner, heroically and fruitlessly hurled itself in frontal attacks against *Longstreet* at Marye's Hill. *Stonewall* was in favour of at

once delivering a vigorous counter-stroke, and even proposed a night attack : *Lee* overruled him. Henderson adversely comments on the latter's failure to attack his defeated enemy ; but Allan, in his " Army of Northern Virginia," considers *Lee* was prudent in view of the numerous Federal artillery. During a terrific storm (December 15) Burnside passed to the north bank, crossing 100,000 men in fourteen hours—at Wagram Napoléon crossed 180,000 in one night. Thus the Federal general did what is rare in war—namely, after defeat to cross safely a river immediately in the rear; this same feat was performed by Buller after Spion Kop. The Federal loss was 12,000 ; the Confederate loss, 5,000. On December 25 *Stuart* began his Christmas Day raid, cutting in between Burnside's army and Washington, and during it he lost many horses.

CHAPTER X

CHANCELLORSVILLE

IN January, 1863, Burnside, in the so-called "Mud Campaign," tried to turn *Lee's* left, but later on in the same month was replaced by "Fighting Joe" Hooker in the supreme command of the army which still lay north of the Rappahannock opposite *Lee's* position. Hooker, the chief intriguer against Burnside, but a good organiser, first collected the cavalry into a separate corps under the incapable Stoneman. As the year advanced, the Southern prospects did not grow brighter, for although Lincoln's legal or illegal edict of January 1 emancipating all slaves hardened the hearts of the South and disgusted Northern Democrats like McClellan, it invigorated the North. Hooker's Army too numbered 130,000, and the Northerners controlled nearly all the Mississippi, and even in Virginia they held Winchester, Fort Monroe, and Suffolk (west of Norfolk), whilst at sea Lincoln's vessels were ever tightening their grip. The presence of the Federals at Suffolk so alarmed *President Davis*

for the safety of Richmond that he ordered *Lee* to detach *Longstreet* with 20,000 men to that district. Thus weakened, the Confederate general had to meet Hooker's enormous numbers.

That general's plan was to move on three lines—namely, his 10,000 cavalry under Stoneman far on the right *via* the Orange and Alexandria Railway, to cut *Lee's* communications with Richmond; his left under Sedgwick, 40,000 strong, to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg; his right, 70,000 strong, to cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan on to Chancellorsville, under his personal orders, a separate body being left to cover the connection with Acquia Creek. It may be noted that this double passage was unwise. *Lee* stood south-west of Fredericksburg with 60,000 men. Hooker began to move on April 27, completely turning his enemy's formidable position; *Lee* therefore contained Sedgwick with 10,000 troops under *Early*, and massed the rest of his force against Hooker himself. These movements led to the stubborn *Battle of Chancellorsville*, May 1-5, in the forest of the Wilderness of Spottsylvania. During May 2 *Lee*, with 17,000 only, remained in front (on the east) of Hooker's strong position at Chancellorsville; whilst *Jackson* and *Stuart*, with about 30,000 men, moved to the left in order to turn Hooker's right flank. They passed through the thick forest on to the turnpike and were seen by the Federals,

Map 14

who supposed it was a retreat, and at 6 p.m. *Jackson*, moving east, smote the extreme right of the enemy and routed it; *Lee*, on hearing his guns, at once advanced to the assault. Hooker was in deadly peril; his line of retreat to the United States Ford was in danger. *Jackson's* men poured along the road to Chancellorsville, getting disordered among the trees and in the darkness, and it was then that the general was hit by three musket-shots from the 18th North Carolina Regiment (his own troops). *General A. P. Hill* was also severely wounded, and the command fell on *J. E. B. Stuart*, who did not realise that *Jackson's* plan had been to cut Hooker's line of retreat at White House.

The Federals then delivered a somewhat vigorous counter-attack, and by May 3 their position was much improved. *Stuart* and *Lee* made a concentric effort against Hooker, who on his side ordered Sedgwick to press actively the force in his front and take *Lee* in the rear. The success of Sedgwick in carrying Marye's Hill and forcing back the Confederate containing force caused *Lee*, on May 4, to move in person against him, with the result that the Federal general recrossed at Banks' Ford, Hooker sending him no assistance. On May 5 and 6, Hooker, covered by a heavy storm, passed over his bridges to the north bank. The two armies retired to their old positions, Hooker having failed mainly

because he had sent away his powerful body of horsemen; but if he had continued the struggle he should have proved victorious, with the help of Stoneman threatening *Lee's* communications. The losses were 17,000 Federals, 13,000 Confederates.

Jackson died on May 10. His fall had saved the Federals from ruin, and was, in addition to want of supplies and a widespread belief that President Lincoln would at last concede separation, a principal reason for *Lee* not pursuing his defeated enemy. *Lee* said: "Such an executive officer the sun never shone on—straight as the needle to the pole; I had better have fallen myself." Of *Lee*, *Jackson* said: "I would follow him blindfold."

NAVAL OPERATIONS OFF THE EAST COAST

The Federals blockaded Charleston in South Carolina, and during the operations lost the *Monitor* in a storm. The Federal commander was Rear-Admiral Du Pont, whose ironclads could not cope with the Confederate batteries, especially in the battle of April 7, 1863.

CHAPTER XI

GENERAL COMMENTS

REVIEW of the Valley Campaign.—Allan, in his "Jackson's Valley Campaign," says: "The operations of *General T. J. Jackson* in the Valley during 1862 constitute one of the most brilliant episodes of the great Civil War. The theatre on which they took place afforded a quick and easy approach to the Federal capital. The mountains and rivers of the Valley gave to an active and skilful commander many opportunities of neutralising great disparity of force. This campaign had a most important bearing on all the military operations in Virginia, for he checked forces four or five times as numerous as his own, and thus paralysed McClellan. It is an admirable example of an aggressive-defensive campaign."

S. C. Kellogg, in his "Shenandoah Valley," remarks of the Valley Campaign that "the student must be impressed with the strategical eminence of *Stonewall Jackson*, as compared with the lack of capacity on the part of his opponents. On the Federal side the authorities at Washington were

still groping for suitable commanders for their thousands of ardent but inexperienced soldiers. For a past-master in the art of war like *Jackson* to handle an army, how inferior soever, against Patterson, Banks, or Frémont, was not difficult." The same author calls especial attention to the Southern general's rapid and successful escape at the end of May from the midst of 60,000 converging foes.

Allan, in "Jackson's Valley Campaign," thus reviews the operations of the three months preceding the Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic :

"*Jackson*, with 4,600 men, fell back from Winchester before Banks' 30,000 (20,000 practically), but, appearing unexpectedly at Kernstown, hurls his little army against part of Banks' army. He is mistaken as to the number of the enemy, and suffers a severe repulse; but he causes the recall of all Banks' force and the detachment of McDowell from McClellan. Falling back before his pursuers, he retires to Elk Run Valley (Swift Run Gap), where he leaves *Ewell* to contain Banks, while he himself joins *Ed. Johnson* near Staunton. He fights Milroy at McDowell, and drives him back on General Frémont. *Jackson* then counter-marches, and, with *Ewell*, unexpectedly appears at Front Royal, crushes a Federal detachment there, and two days after defeats Banks at Winchester, driving him over the Potomac. McDowell is again withdrawn from McClellan, and the President

gathers 60,000 men against *Jackson's* 16,000; but by rapidity he eludes his pursuers, and, retiring up the Valley, takes up a position near Port Republic, where he defeats Frémont at Cross Keys, and Shields at Port Republic." In thirty-five days preceding June 9 *Jackson* marched 245 miles, and won four battles.

The whole of the Valley operations were based on the idea of playing on Lincoln's anxiety for Washington, and they have the honour of being compared with Napoléon's operations in 1814, east of Paris, and in 1796 in North Italy. This is doubtless comparing small things with great, but *Jackson* did no doubt illustrate with fine skill the true use of a detachment engaged in minor operations (contrast the British detachment in the east of Spain, 1813). The main objection to detachments is that they must weaken the main force; they are, however, often unavoidable, and if they are well led, and if they contain larger numbers of the enemy, greatly assist the main action. The principal advantage gained for the south by *Jackson's* action was the fact that McDowell was four times withdrawn from McClellan.

The value of strategic positions is obvious. Winchester and Staunton were such positions; so also was the Newmarket-Luray road, as well as Swift Run Gap—the last because its front was covered by the Shenandoah and its flanks by the mountains; there were roads in rear connecting

with General *Ewell*; in case Banks went to Staunton, he would expose his flank to *Jackson*; in case he attacked *Jackson* and were beaten, he would find himself in a hostile country.

The Confederate leader constantly showed that he believed in secrecy, in surprise, and in mystifying friends no less than foes, a course particularly advisable in a civil war, in which leakage so often occurs.

The features of *Jackson's* tactics were flanking movements, as at Kernstown and at Port Republic; reserving of fire and use of bayonet, as at Cross Keys and at First Bull Run; surprise, as at Front Royal; vigorous pursuit, as at Bath and after Front Royal; counter-stroke; superiority of numbers on the field; sending in of supports at the right moment. Sharpsburg, 1862, displayed his tactics in all their excellence.

Comments on the Campaign generally.—Both sides had three objectives: (1) Protect their own capital, (2) threaten the hostile capital, (3) defeat the hostile army; but, while this was the case, it is obvious that the Northerners paid chief attention to protecting Washington and to threatening Richmond, the Southerners to dealing with the Federal armies.

This campaign once again illustrates the employment of interior and exterior lines, the former by the Confederates and the latter by the Federals; and in this case and in this period the

former succeeded. That they did so act is apparent during the whole campaign, and can be clearly seen in July, 1861, from the relative positions of Patterson, McDowell, and the Federals in West Virginia, and of *Johnston*, *Beauregard*, and the Confederates in West Virginia. At Cross Keys, and Port Republic too, *Jackson* was obviously on interior lines, and the two Federal armies obviously on exterior lines. Throughout the whole of the operations the Southerners acted from Richmond, and fell back on it concentrically; whereas the enemy assailed that city from widely divergent points, such as from Fort Monroe, Fredericksburg, the Valley, and the Great Kanawha Valley. Frémont, Banks, McDowell, McClellan, and Burnside should, theoretically, have pushed on and crushed the Confederates near Richmond, as Moltke's converging armies in 1866 crushed the Austrians at Königgrätz. On the other side, *Johnston* and *Lee*, with consummate skill, carried out the Napoleonic principle of interior lines, containing all the hostile armies with detachments, and finally concentrating against one of the separated Federal armies—e.g. *Jackson* contained Frémont and Banks, *Anderson* contained McDowell, *Magruder* contained McClellan, and *Huger* at Norfolk contained Burnside.

It is to be noted that the Confederates possessed a salient or convex frontier, whilst the Federals

possessed a re-entrant or concave one; this is so whether you look at the line of the River Potomac and the sea, or at the line of the Atlantic seaboard and of the Gulf of Mexico. As Richmond, the base of the Southerners, was inside this projection, they could not be forced to form front to a flank, and could always fall back concentrically. The disadvantages arising from a base situated farther back—and it is usually so situated, because most salients are too small to contain the base—than the salient frontier (provided that it is impossible to take the offensive) are well illustrated by the French position in 1870 and by the British position in Natal in 1899; in those two cases it would have been well for the defender to have retired from the salient.

The counter-stroke is the soul of the defence—this is true strategically and tactically; and not the least cause of the defeat of the South was *Mr. Davis'* persistent refusal to allow offensive action. The Valley Campaign of *Jackson* is a sermon on the above text, notably in January, 1862, when, Banks seemingly inclined to advance, the Confederate leader, though inferior in numbers, at once, in the Romney expedition, took the offensive; tactically he trusted much to the counter-stroke, *e.g.* at First Bull Run, etc. That *Lee* held the same opinion is evident from his invasion of Maryland—the purely defensive attitude cannot succeed unless in exceptional circumstances.

The Influence of Politicians.—McClellan did not sufficiently consider the opinion of the President, who was a Republican, whereas the general was a Democrat. At the close of 1861 he could have crushed *Johnston*, but he over-estimated his numbers and annoyed the Government by inaction. He created the great Army of the Potomac, but was always waiting till everything should be quite ready. Surely he could have attacked *Johnston* or the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac or Norfolk. It is usual to quote the influence of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton as a striking case of the pernicious effect of politicians interfering with current military operations, and no doubt the creation of five separate commands and of army corps and the appointing of corps commanders without McClellan's approval, the constant withdrawals of McDowell, and the attempt to intercept *Jackson* in the Valley were gross cases of unwise interference; but we must not forget that Clausewitz lays it down that the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace must be left to statesmen, and that, as to the disputed point whether statesmen should interfere with current operations, it all depends on the wisdom or the folly of the statesmen's policy—*e.g.* no one would allege that Bismarck's interference with Moltke in 1866 and 1870 was foolish. In 1864 Lincoln had learnt his lesson and handed all military power to Grant, who never suffered from interference as McClellan

suffered, or as the Archduke Charles suffered in 1799 at the hands of the Aulic Council.

It is a common error to assume that *Mr. Davis*, who had military knowledge, not only interfered less, but also that his interference had less disastrous results than in the case of his great opponent. The truth is that he did far more harm to his cause than Lincoln did to the Northern cause. He interfered a good deal, especially with *Joseph E. Johnston*, and he had two false notions—he expected European help because a cotton famine would hamper European manufacturers, and he did not believe in taking offensive action. Besides, he should have exported cotton in the first months of the war, and so got money which he sorely needed. In any event, however, the South must have bowed to the iron will of the Northern President.

The Effect of Parallel Obstacles.—The Massanutts screened from Banks at Strasburg *Jackson's* offensive movement down the Luray road on Front Royal; the same obstacle hampered Banks in his advance up the Valley; the same obstacle taught Frémont and Shields how perilous it is for allied armies to move simultaneously on the opposite side of a parallel obstacle.

Volunteers and Regulars.—The Boer War has caused many to think that the armed farmer is a match for the trained regular; but Lord Wolseley holds that one trained army corps

would have, at least in 1861, settled the question; and on three occasions we see the United States regulars alone preserving cohesion in defeat (in the two Battles of Bull Run and at Gaines Mill). On the march, volunteers may equal regulars, but it is in military housekeeping and in action, and indeed in offensive operations generally, that the regular is seen to excel the armed patriot. Callwell, in his "Small Wars," states that in only two modern instances have guerillas proved more than a match for regular troops—namely, the Cuban insurgents beat the Spaniards, and the Abyssinians at Adowa defeated the Italians.

The infantry tactics were much like present European tactics, except that inferior officers in the United States had not a free hand, and that the brigade was the tactical unit. Brigade and division commanders were extremely independent. Spade and axe and shelter-trenches were employed both on offensive and on defensive. A more interesting and important subject is the use made of the mounted arm: the cavalry on both sides were really mounted infantry and fought mostly on foot. The uses of cavalry—the strategic arm before battle—are: Scouting, screening, pursuing, charging, and perhaps raiding. The War of Secession revived the first two uses of this arm, forgotten since the days of Napoléon, and *Jackson's* cavalry, under *Ashby*, did excellent

scouting and screening, and so did *Stuart* throughout the whole period. *Ashby* screened *Jackson's* move towards Front Royal, and *Stuart's* scouting informed *Lee* of *Burnside's* movements before Fredericksburg. In pursuit *Jackson* was always vigorous, as at Bath, and indeed always where it was possible. On the disputed point of cavalry charges in battle, the facts of this campaign can be quoted on either side—*Stuart's* charges at the First Bull Run and at the Second Bull Run (this was against cavalry) were successful; but the Federal charges at Winchester, at Cedar Mount, and at Gaines Mill were costly failures. The most remarkable feat of the mounted arm was the success of *Colonel Flournoy* at Front Royal.

Whether a cavalry raid is or is not advisable is a moot question; *Jackson* apparently objected to them, *Lee* acquiesced in them. In the War of Secession they were extensively employed, e.g., by *Stuart* and by *Stoneman*. *Stuart's* raids were the Pamunkey, the Catlett's Station, the Pennsylvania, and the Christmas Day raid, 1862; *Stoneman* raided during Chancellorsville. Such raids are certainly more applicable to America than to Europe, and in any case the objections to them are weighty—e.g., waste of horseflesh, damage inflicted can soon be repaired, the main army may regret the absence of its horsemen (as *Hooker* did at Chancellorsville), the raiding

cavalry runs the risk of being wiped out. On the other hand, the raid inflicts damage, destroys the enemy's *moral*, raises one's own *moral*, and at times gains valuable information, as *Stuart* did at Catlett's. On the whole, the balance of opinion seems to be against such use of cavalry.

Importance of Studying an Opponent's Character.

—This was a constant practice of *Jackson*, and the conduct of the various officers in Mexico frequently gave their opponents in the Civil War a key as to what to expect of them in the greater struggle. *McClellan's* ability and caution were correctly appraised by *Lee*, who was surprised when that general acted with unusual rapidity during the South Mountain actions, a rapidity due to his capture of *Lee's* orders. *Jackson* justly appreciated the lengths to which he could go when opposed by *Banks*; nor would *Lee* have dared his risky separations if, instead of *Pope*, it had been *Sherman* or *Grant* in front of him.

Secrecy and Surprise.—*Napoléon*, *Hannibal*, and *Wellington* excelled in secret surprises, and *Jackson* was no mean imitator: witness his moves against *Milroy*, against *Kenly*, and against *McClellan* in June, 1862, and against *Pope* in August. But he carried his reticence too far; this injured him before Cedar Mount, and injured his cause materially in the Battle of Chancellorsville.

LIST OF QUESTIONS

1. Narrate the causes of the great American Civil War.
2. Give a description of the theatre of war generally, and more especially of Virginia.
3. Comment on and illustrate from these campaigns : Civilian interference ; qualities of regulars as contrasted with those of volunteers ; the effect of parallel mountains.
4. Sketch the events leading up to the Battle of First Bull Run or First Manassas, July 21, 1861.
5. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of First Bull Run or First Manassas, July 21, 1861. What remarks occur to you as applicable to this battle ?
6. Comment on : Organisation ; armament ; and especially on the cavalry.
7. Show the strategic importance of West Virginia ; and give a detailed description of the Shenandoah Valley, and show its strategic importance to either side.
8. Describe the events in the Valley leading to the Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862.
9. State and discuss the plans of campaign urged by President Lincoln, and by General McClellan.
10. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862. Give some tactical comments on it, and state its strategic results.
11. Show the general strategic situation in the middle of May, 1862. Describe the march of Jackson and Ewell on Front Royal with the action at that place, May 23, 1862.
12. Show the strategic results of the Battles of Front Royal and Winchester.

13. Describe the attempt of Frémont and Shields to intercept Jackson at Strasburg, and account for its failure.

14. Show the strategic effects of Cross Keys and Port Republic.

15. Write a general review of the Valley Campaign, and of its influence on the progress of war generally; note Jackson's use of cavalry, his marching powers, and his frequent separation in the presence of the enemy.

16. State and explain the several withdrawals of McDowell from McClellan.

17. Sketch, and estimate the effect of, all the cavalry raids in this period.

18. Describe, with rough sketch: (1) the Battle of Antietam and (2) the Battle of Fredericksburg.

19. What led to the Seven Days' Battles, and what was the general result of those actions? (June 25 to July 1, 1862).

20. Lee and Pope faced each other on the Rappahannock during August, 1862. Describe the movements of both armies leading to the Battle of Second Bull Run, or Second Manassas, August 30, 1862.

21. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Second Bull Run, or Second Manassas, August 30, 1862.

22. Sketch events immediately preceding the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-5, 1863, and give a rough plan of that battle.

23. Briefly describe the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-5, 1863.

24. Estimate the effect on this battle of the fall of Jackson.

25. Describe Jackson's two flank marches—the one on Manassas Junction, the other on Chantilly; show their objects and effects. Are flank marches always dangerous?

SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Show how the possession of sea-power was utilised by the Northerners during the period.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE

The command of the sea, always in the hands of Lincoln, gave the Federals the usual advantage of an extensive base, *i.e.* it secured them, in spite of the skill of their opponents, against the possibility of capture, and throughout the whole war no Federal army was ever so cut off that it had to surrender; Pope, for instance, was always able to retire on some base, though Jackson manœuvred so ably against him. Command of the sea, too, enables a general to change his base, as McClellan did during the period of the Seven Days' Battles; it confers the power of transferring troops, as we see when the Army of the Potomac was transferred from Fort Monroe to Acquia Creek and to Alexandria; and indeed no other country has carried out this work on such a large scale as the United States, excepting only Great Britain and Japan. The great defect of this sea-transport is the evil effect it has on the horses.

The command of the sea also hides one's plans, and it was Johnston's fear of a secret Federal move by the Potomac that induced him so suddenly to evacuate Centreville in March. The same power renders the communications safe, as we see McClellan's were to Fort Monroe, and the converse is illustrated by the fact that the Confederates' lack of vessels always rendered it almost impossible for them to obtain supplies from Europe, except by the precarious plan

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of running the blockade, which English and other neutrals constantly attempted.

2. Taking the period from, but not including, Fredericksburg to the death of Jackson, give the strategical and tactical lessons you find in the operations.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE

Stuart, in his Christmas Day raid, cut in between Burnside and Washington, but in doing so paid the penalty of losing many horses. Burnside, in his January effort to turn Lee's left, was checked by what Napoléon called one of the elements that disturb war—mud. President Davis, by insisting on the despatch of Longstreet with 20,000 men from Lee's army, in order to protect Richmond from the Federals at Suffolk, committed a great error. He weakened his main army, and indirectly was the cause of the negative effort of the Chancellorsville victory. Hooker's double passage of the Rappahannock River is seen to be unwise. The flank movement of Jackson and Stuart was a brilliant effort, carried out with exceeding decision and striking Hooker on his exposed right flank, much as Kirby Smith struck McDowell's exposed flank at the First Bull Run. Jackson's excessive reticence in not informing Stuart of his plan of severing the enemy's line at White House had disastrous results. The absence of Hooker's great body of horsemen was felt by the Federals throughout the long battle. Lee failed to pursue, and though there were several reasons for his failure, and though vigorous pursuit is never easy, yet we must account it an error on the part of that great commander.

3. Show the use of detaining forces in strategy, and also in tactics.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE

A containing or detaining force—much the same as a rearguard—is one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of a commander, and it can delay, especially in a rugged terrain, the advance of an immensely superior body

SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 117

for a very considerable period. Its great rules are that it should not commit itself to a general action; that it should retire the moment it is outnumbered; that it should not attempt to act so far distant from its main body that it will be reduced to a skeleton in the course of its operations, for losses are of necessity heavy in the case of such detaining operations; and that, nevertheless, it must be pushed far enough out to keep the divided forces of the enemy from uniting, because, if they should unite, the presumably superior numbers of the double-line forces would ensure them the victory. These rules hold good practically both for tactics and for strategy. A good case of a strategic detaining force is Magruder's 11,000 men in the Yorktown Peninsula, who so long held back McClellan's great army, and gave time for the arrival of Johnston. In tactics detaining operations are illustrated by Lee's employment of 10,000 men to hold Hooker's left, under Sedgwick, during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

4. Show the influence and effect of rivers on military operations.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE

I will first deal with rivers as direct obstacles. They are less formidable than they were as obstacles, owing to the existence of modern bridges and the large number of pontoons carried by modern armies; but to cross a defended river at a known point is one of the costliest operations of war. The assailant, therefore, has recourse to stratagem, and even then he should possess a superiority in guns—all this illustrated by Burnside's passage at Fredericksburg. If the defender be concentrated, the assailant should employ a turning force, which should have been Burnside's course at Fredericksburg instead of a direct attack; he should have turned Lee's left, as Hooker attempted in the following year. The peril of such a turning force is that it may be struck on its outer flank, as occurred at First Bull Run and at Chancellorsville. This outer flank should, therefore, be thrown back. But the especial danger of an army that

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sends such a turning force across a river is, that its own main body on its own side of the stream protecting its line may be struck during the operation and its line severed. What would have been the fate of McDowell if at the moment of Kirby Smith's onset Beauregard had let loose his right across Bull Run full on Centreville? We know, too, that McClellan, astride the Chickahominy, when struck on his own side at Gaines Mill, was saved only by his command of the sea and his consequent power of transferring his base.

Rivers can also act as screens, and are of importance as having great cities on their banks; but as lines of communication and as lines of invasion their place has, at least in civilised countries, been usurped by railways.

Rivers parallel to an army's march present peculiar problems; when moving along them it is necessary to hold or destroy the passages, as Jackson did when retiring before Frémont and Shields; and it is a matter of great moment whether the defender can or cannot pass to either bank at pleasure, as is obvious in the case of Jackson at Port Republic, where the bridge gave him that immense advantage.

The most remarkable passage of a great river was that of Napoléon over the Danube with 180,000 men by six bridges in one night, just before the battle of Wagram. Whether an army should stand and fight with its back to a river depends upon whether the distance between it and the stream is or is not sufficient to allow of its retreat being organised before reaching the passage; it is clear, however, that Burnside's escape after Fredericksburg is an exception, and that he owed his safety to an opportune storm.

5. Describe briefly and discuss fully the operations at Cross Keys and Port Republic.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE

The two Federal generals, Frémont and Shields, pursued Jackson up the Valley, the former by the turnpike, the

SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 119


latter by the Luray road, and on June 7 Frémont, at Harrisonburg, had ascertained the enemy's position, whilst Shields, with his force dangerously strung out, was pressing up the Luray road. Meantime, Jackson had thus posted his men—Ewell with 6,000 was at Cross Keys in face of Frémont, Jackson himself with 7,000 had his trains, hospital, etc., in Port Republic, and his troops on the heights north of the town and west of the South Fork. Next day, the 8th, took place the Battle of Cross Keys, in which Frémont, with 12,000, was repulsed by Ewell's 6,000, and during which the leading troops of Shields made a dash across the fords into Port Republic, and nearly captured the Confederate leader. On June 9 Jackson left some of Ewell's force to contain Frémont, and, marching the rest of his men across the Port Republic bridge and the waggon bridge, which latter he had constructed over the South River, fought the desperate engagement of Port Republic with Tyler, who commanded Shields' vanguard of about 3,500; finally, the Confederates were victorious, but Jackson had to call up the containing force from in front of Frémont and burn the Port Republic bridge. Tyler fell back northwards on Shields, and Frémont slowly occupied the bluffs west of the South Fork, whence he impotently shelled the victorious enemy.

On these operations the following strategic remarks suggest themselves: The evils of divided command are apparent, for Shields and Frémont did not know each other's movements, and hence arose indecision; they acted on double and exterior lines, and as they had far superior numbers—a total of 25,000 against 13,000—they might, if acting with skill and decision, have crushed Jackson between them, as Napoléon was crushed by Wellington and Blucher at Waterloo. But they had not the ability, and had to deal not only with a superior antagonist, but also to act in a terrain that admirably lent itself to interior-line operations. The river was an obstacle separating their forces, and its only passage at Port Republic was in Jackson's hands. One should also note the failure of the Confederate

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cavalry to report the sudden advance of Shields' leading troops on Port Republic on June 8.

Tactically Frémont displayed great weakness at Cross Keys, considering his superior numbers, especially in guns and horsemen, whilst Ewell showed admirable judgment, not only in the manner in which he reserved fire till the enemy arrived within sixty paces, and in which he delivered a counter-stroke on the Federal left, but also in his judicious refusal to pursue, for night was coming on, and neither would pursuit have suited Jackson's general plan. On the same day Jackson saved himself at Port Republic by his vigorous promptness; it may be remarked that both Napoléon and Wellington ran a similar risk of capture. At the Battle of Port Republic, Tyler occupied a well-chosen position, and fought with stubborn skill, as he had previously at Kernstown, and his defeat was due to Jackson's able turning movement and to the desperate courage of the Louisianians who executed that movement. The victor's tactics, nevertheless, were faulty—he assailed the enemy too soon, and with insufficient numbers. In fact, he grasped at too much; his idea was to crush Shields in the morning and Frémont in the afternoon, and this was the reason of his hurried attack, with its consequent heavy loss. His pursuit was, as usual, vigorous.



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
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
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BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

May 1-5, 1862.


Scale: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, 10 miles.



BATTLE OF ANTIETA SHARPSBURG.

September 17, 1862.

Confederate front, 6 miles.




BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

December 13, 1862.

Confederate front, 6 miles.


N.B.—Railway Bridge broken.



BATTLE OF SECOND MANASSAS OR, SECOND BULL RUN.

August 30, 1862.

Scale: 2½ miles, from Groveton to Stone Bridge.




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BATTLE OF PORT REPUBLIC.

June 9, 1862.


Scale : Port Republic to Lewiston, 2 miles.



BATTLES OF FRONT ROYAL & WINCHESTER.

May 23 & May 25, 1862.

Scale: Strasburg to Winchester, 18 miles.




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BATTLE OF CROSS KEYS.

June 8, 1862.



Scale: Cross Keys to Harrisonburg, 6 miles.



BATTLE OF MAC DOWELL.

May 8, 1862.

Scale: Hull's Hill to Stirling's Hill, 1 mile.




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BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

May 5, 1862.

Scale: Battle front, 4 miles.




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BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.

March 28, 1862.


Scale : Winchester to Kernstown, 2½ miles.



BATTLE OF FIRST MANASSAS OR BULL RUN.

July 21, 1861.

Scale : Stone Bridge to Manassas Junction, 5 miles.



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SHENANDOAH VALLEY & WEST VIRGINIA.

Scale: Strasburg to Winchester, 18 miles.

